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ARTICLES
WHEN LIBIDO SUBVERTS CREDO:
REGULATION OF ATrORNEY-CLIENT
SEXUAL RELATIONS
MAR GIT LIVINGSTON*
Recent calls for increased regulation of attorney-client sexual relations have led
several state courts, legislatures, and bar associations to consider specific rules
restricting such practices. Advocates of enhanced regulation seek institutional
recognition of the power differential inherent in the lawyer-client relationship.
Critics prefer to rely on existing ethics rules governing attorney misconduct. In
this Article Professor Livingston first reviews the judicial and administrative re-
sponse to clients who accuse their attorneys of sexual impropriety She next ex-
amines recently enacted state rules regulating attorney sexual misconduct and
discusses pending legislative proposals. Professor Livingston then recommends a
ban on all attorney-client sexual relations where the client is an individual, except
where the parties had apre-existing relationship. Finally, she discusses her propo-
sal as compared to current rules governing the psychiatrist-patient relationship
and in light of relevant constitutional considerations.
INTRODUCTION
F OR several years the professional associations for psychiatrists, psy-
choanalysts, and psychologists have had specific rules forbidding
therapists from engaging in sexual relations with their patients during the
time of treatment.' These rules recognize that sexual relationships be-
tween therapists and patients may interfere with therapists' objectivity
and injure patients.' Within the last three years members of the legal
profession have called for a similar prohibition on sexual relations be-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. Augsburg College,
1971; M.A. 1976, J.D. 1975, University of Minnesota; LL.M., University of Illinois,
1979. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law Summer Research Fund and the invaluable research assistance of law
students Dana Simaitis and Christina Riewer in the preparation of this Article.
1. See American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and
Code of Conduct § 4.05 (1992); The American Psychoanalytic Association, Principles of
Ethics for Psychoanalysts and Provisions for Implementation of the Principles of Ethics
for Psychoanalysts § 10 (1983); Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially
Applicable to Psychiatry of the American Psychiatric Association, in Psychiatric Ethics
§ 1(2) app. (Sidney Bloch & Paul Chodoff eds., 1981).
2. See Phyllis Coleman, Sex Between Psychiatrist and Former Patient: A Proposal
for a "No Harm, No Foul" Rule, 41 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1988); Linda Jorgenson et al.,
The Furor Over Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact: New Solutions to an Old Prob-
lem, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 645, 647-48 (1991); Alan A. Stone, The Legal Implications
of Sexual Activity Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 133 Am. J. Psychiatry 1138, 1138
(1976); Seymour L. Zelen, Sexualization of Therapeutic Relationships: The Dual Vulner-
ability of Patient and Therapist, 22 Psychotherapy 178, 180-81 (1985); Karen A. Popp,
Note, Mazza v. Huffaker: Sex with the Patient's Spouse is Negligent Psychiatric Treat-
ment, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 1437, 1437-38 (1984).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
tween attorneys and their clients during the period of representation.
Such a prohibition is necessary, it is thought, because some attorneys
have abused their fiduciary role by attempting to have a social as well as
a professional relationship with their clients. The image of the randy
male divorce lawyer, a la Arnie Becker,4 attempting to date attractive
female clients has received wider recognition among both practitioners
and the public.' Many feel that this image adds fuel to the public percep-
tion of lawyers as unethical and self-seeking. 6 In addition, civil suits by
disgruntled clients in several states reveal that the so-called "Arnie
Becker syndrome" is more than merely some scriptwriter's fantasy.7
Increased sensitivity to the possible abuses inherent in attorney-client
relationships has led members of the legal community and state legisla-
tures to call for specific restrictions on attorney-client sexual relations.
These proposals range from a prohibition on relations where the client is
too vulnerable to give informed consent to a ban on all sexual relations
between attorneys and clients during the course of representation.8
This Article begins with a discussion of the problems raised by attor-
3. California was the first state to take official action on this issue. In 1989 the
California legislature passed a law requiring the state bar association to adopt a specific
"rule of professional conduct governing sexual relations between attorneys and their cli-
ents in cases involving, but not limited to, probate matters and domestic relations." Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 6106.8(b) (West 1990) [hereinafter Cal. Bar Act].
4. Arnie Becker, a character on the popular television series, L.A. Law (NBC televi-
sion broadcast), is notorious for his pursuit and seduction of his female clients.
5. Available statistics show that in cases of sexual misconduct by professionals
against their clients, the professional is likely to be male and the client female. See Peter
Rutter, M.D., Sex in the Forbidden Zone 38-41 (1989); Nanette Gartrell et al., Preva-
lence of Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact, in Sexual Exploitation in Professional Rela-
tionships 3, 7 (Glen 0. Gabbard ed., 1989). To reflect this reality, the masculine pronoun
may be used to refer to attorneys throughout this Article whereas the feminine pronoun
may be used to refer to clients. Although misconduct by a female professional against a
male client and same sex misconduct do occur, gendered pronouns where necessary will
reflect the most common gender identities of the parties.
6. See Attorney Discipline: Do We Need an Ethical Rule Restricting Sexual Relations
with Clients?, 78 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 34; Peter J. Riga, Hands Off the Clients, Nat'l
L.J., July 1, 1991, at 13.
7. See infra part II.B.
8. A number of scholars have also suggested that the bar should regulate attorney-
client sexual relations more closely. See Phyllis Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Rela-
tionships: Taking Unfair Advantage of the "Fair" Sex, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 95 (1988); Law-
rence Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client off Limits?, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
585 (1988); Caroline Forell, Lawyers, Clients and Sex: Breaking the Silence on the Ethi-
cal and Liability Issues, 22 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 611 (1992); Nancy E. Goldberg, Sex
and the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Argument for a Prophylactic Rule, 26 Akron L.
Rev. 45 (1992); Linda M. Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Fiduciary Theory Applied
to Personal Dealings: Attorney-Client Sexual Contact, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 459 (1992); Yacl
Levy, Attorneys, Clients and Sex: Conflicting Interests in the California Rule, 5 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 649 (1992); Thomas Lyon, Note, Sexual Exploitation of Divorce Clients:
The Lawyer's Prerogative?, 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 159 (1987); John M. O'Connell, Note,
Keeping Sex Out of the Attorney-Client Relationship: A Proposed Rule, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
887 (1992).
ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEXUAL RELATIONS
ney-client sexual relations.9 Part II reviews both administrative censure
by the bar and civil suits by aggrieved clients.' 0 Part III examines the
recently enacted California and Oregon rules regulating attorney sexual
misconduct as well as proposals under consideration in other states such
as Illinois." Part IV suggests that regulation is needed and proposes a
modified ban that would prohibit all attorney-client sexual relations
where the client is an individual. 2 This suggested rule contains excep-
tions for situations in which attorneys and their clients have an ongoing
sexual relationship immediately before the period of representation and
for situations in which the client is a corporation or other entity. Finally,
this Article explores the policies favoring a specific new rule in light of
suggestions that the present bar rules are adequate to address injurious
behavior.
a13
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A common scenario in which attorney-client sexual relations often
arise involves a female client contemplating a divorce who contacts a
male attorney for legal advice.' After an initial consultation, the attor-
ney suggests that they meet later to continue their discussion. The client
confides her disappointment at the failure of her marriage and her con-
cern over financial matters and the custody of her children. She con-
fesses that her husband is having an affair with another woman causing
her to feel unloved and unattractive. The attorney appears kind, atten-
tive, and understanding. Whether the attorney and the client have one
such intimate tete-d-tete or several, eventually, the attorney may attempt
to initiate a sexual relationship with the client. The client may refuse,
fire the attorney, and seek representation elsewhere. On the other hand,
the client may accede to the attorney's wishes, and the two may continue
their liaison throughout the pending divorce proceedings and beyond.
Under this scenario it is questionable whether a sexual relationship,
even one appearing fully consensual, is so inherently injurious to the cli-
ent or to public confidence in the legal profession that ethical rules
should prohibit it. Courts and disciplinary committees have identified
several types of potential injury to clients who engage in sexual relation-
ships with their attorneys. These include possible inadequate representa-
tion of the clients, harm to the clients' interests in pending divorce or
9. See infra text accompanying notes 14-16.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 17-254.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 255-308.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 309-23.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 324-74.
14. See Dubin, supra note 8, at 595-97. Professor Dubin uses a similar hypothetical
situation to illustrate the potential conflict of interest problems. See id. Obviously, mat-
rimonial clients are not the only ones who may be receptive or vulnerable to the advances
of their lawyers. Clients seeking representation in probate, criminal, bankruptcy, or im-
migration matters may be at a low ebb in their lives and may be drawn to the seeming
concern and authority of their attorneys.
1993]
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custody proceedings, and the possibility that the attorneys could be
called as witnesses against their clients."5 While current ethical codes
provide some checks on these types of harmful results, 16 it is debatable
whether they adequately prevent any but the most egregious instances of
attorney sexual misconduct.
II. PAST ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES
There have been a number of ethics opinions, disciplinary proceedings,
and civil suits addressing the issue of attorney-client sexual relations."
A survey of these materials reveals the difficulty in formulating a worka-
ble prophylactic rule. Past efforts aimed at regulation have been most
effective only in cases of serious and repeated sexual misconduct toward
clients.
A. Administrative Regulation
State bar associations and tribunals have struggled for several years to
delineate the circumstances under which attorneys should refrain from
engaging in a sexual relationship with their clients. The reported ethical
opinions and disciplinary decisions reach various conclusions, largely be-
cause of an attempt to apply existing bar rules to a given situation. 8 In
cases involving sexual assaults and other criminal actions, courts and bar
associations have had little difficulty in finding sanctions appropriate.' 9
With respect to apparently consensual attorney-client sexual relation-
ships commenced during representation, however, disciplinary bodies are
torn between a perceived need to protect the public from abuse2 0 and an
15. See infra part II.A.2-3.
16. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A) (1981) [hereinafter
Model Code].
17. For relevant ethics opinions, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992); Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 92-6 (1992); Alaska
Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 88-1 (1988); Oregon State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Ethics Op.
1991-99. For relevant cases, see McDaniel v. Gile, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that attorney's withholding of legal services to gain sexual favors consti-
tuted breach of fiduciary duty and outrageous conduct for claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress); In re Bowen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied,
545 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1989) (suspending attorney for two years for filing false document
and making sexual advances on female client); In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.
1986) (suspending attorney indefinitely for improper sexual advances).
18. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-
364 (1992) (discussing whether attorney-client sexual relationship violates Model Code of
Professional Responsibility); Oregon State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Ethics Op. 1991-
99 (1991) (holding that attorney's sexual relationship with matrimonial client created
conflict of interest).
19. See, e.g., In re Stanton, 708 P.2d 325 (N.M. 1985) (disbarring attorney for at-
tempted criminal sexual conduct).
20. The Alaska Bar Association noted its concern that "the attorney-client relation-
ship, once established, should not be exploited by the attorney. The attorneys' foremost
duty must be loyalty to the client, not personal gratification." Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics
Op. 92-6 (1992).
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unwillingness to interfere in what may be essentially private matters.21
1. Integrity and General Moral Fitness
Many clients who bring disciplinary actions against their attorneys for
sexual misconduct rely on DR 1-102 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Model Code")' or its counterpart, Rule 8.4, of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").' These rules
address attorney misconduct generally and seek to create broad norma-
tive standards by which attorneys should conduct their professional, and
sometimes personal, affairs.
DR 1-102(A)(3) of the Model Code forbids lawyers from "[e]ngag[ing]
in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude., 24 Courts have disciplined
several attorneys under this rule for engaging in sexual misconduct af-
fecting their clients.25 These cases have involved sexual assaults on a
client, prostitution, or other illegal actions. In In re Adams,26 for exam-
ple, a divorce client came to Adams' office to pay her bill. 27 Adams
grabbed her and began kissing her and raising her blouse.28 The Indiana
Supreme Court publicly reprimanded the lawyer, affirming the discipli-
nary commission's finding that he had engaged in illegal conduct involv-
ing moral turpitude. 9
In some of these cases the sexual assault of the client produced lasting
injury. In a disciplinary proceeding, for example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found that an attorney representing a divorce client had
21. The Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the State
Bar of California refused to recommend a ban on sexual relationships between attorneys
and their clients on the basis that it "appears overly broad and unnecessary." State Bar
of Cal. Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1987-
92 (1988). The Committee wished "to respect the division, however unclear, between the
private and professional lives of lawyers." Id
22. See. eg., In re Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786, 787 (Ind. 1981) (publicly reprimanding
attorney for sexually improper conduct in violation of Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 1-102).
23. See, eg., Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1992) (disbarring
attorney under Florida's adopted version of Rule 8.4 of Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).
24. Model Code, supra note 16, DR 1-102(A)(3).
25. See eg., In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772, 774-76, 778 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (sus-
pending attorney indefinitely with leave to apply for reinstatement in six months for im-
proper sexual advances toward client in prison and after release); In re Stanton, 708 P.2d
325, 327 (N.M. 1985) (disbarring attorney based on his conviction for attempted criminal
sexual contact with female client); In re Bowen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46-48 (N.Y. App.
Div.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1989) (suspending attorney for two years for
making sexual advances and engaging in sexual relations with divorce clients); In re
Gould, 164 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 4 A.D.2d 174 (N.Y. 1957)
(disbarring attorney for luring young women to his office and making sexual advances to
them).
26. 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981).
27. See id at 787.
28. See id
29. See id. It is not clear whether Adams was ever criminally prosecuted for his
actions.
19931
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
assaulted her in her home by pushing her onto her bed and attempting to
remove her clothes.3" A jury later convicted the attorney of fourth de-
gree sexual assault.3" As a result of the incident, as well as her marital
and other problems, the client became severely depressed and even sui-
cidal, requiring hospitalization and extensive psychiatric treatment. 2
The court suspended the attorney for three years for engaging in illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude.33
Quid pro quo arrangements between attorneys and their clients have
led several courts to discipline lawyers under DR 1-102's provision
prohibiting illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. 34 In these cases
attorneys agreed to accept clients' sexual services in lieu of payment of
fees. For example, in In re Conduct of Howard,3 5 a jury earlier had con-
victed the lawyer of prostitution for having sexual relations with a client
as a substitute for his fee for legal services.36 In reprimanding Howard,
the Oregon Supreme Court noted that he had admitted to the conviction
of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
In In re Frick,38 the fallout from a sexual affair with a client prompted
the attorney to commit a series of criminal acts which the Missouri
Supreme Court ultimately found constituted illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude.39 Frick left his wife to live with a divorce client with
whom he had become romantically involved.' When he discovered that
she was seeing other men, they separated and the jealous lawyer began to
harass his former client.4" His behavior became increasingly bizarre over
a period of months as he wrote threatening letters to her and vandalized
her property.42 Frick was finally arrested after he discharged a handgun
at security guards when caught spray painting the woman's name on a
30. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodmansee, 434 N.W.2d 94, 95-96
(Wis. 1989).
31. See id. at 96.
32. See id.
33. See id. The court provided that the lawyer could apply for reinstatement two
years or more after the beginning of the suspension. See id.
34. See, e.g., In re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189, 1190-91 (Ind. 1986) (disbarring attorney
for having client and her aunt pose nude and perform oral sex in exchange for reduction
of fee); In re Wood, 358 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 1976) (suspending attorney for at least one
year for attempting to exchange legal services for sexual favors); Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa
1989) (suspending attorney indefinitely for having sex with client he represented in di-
vorce action involving child custody); In re Discipline of Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856, 857
(S.D. 1990) (suspending attorney for having sexual relationship with clients, providing
alcohol to minor, and kissing minor).
35. 681 P.2d 775 (Or. 1984).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 776.
38. 694 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
39. See id. at 478-79.
40. See id. at 475.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 476-77.
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wall near a university campus.43 Despite Frick's long and distinguished
legal career and despite the signatures of 142 members of the public and
68 attorneys on so-called "amicus curiae briefs" urging leniency or ac-
quittal, the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately affirmed his disbar-
ment.' Frick illustrates the total loss of objectivity by some attorneys
who have sexual liaisons with their clients.
In some cases where attorney misconduct has constituted a crime, the
disciplinary bodies have relied on the more general subsection of the mis-
conduct rule, DR 1-102(A)(6), which bans "conduct that adversely re-
flects on [an attorney's] fitness to practice law." 45 Obviously, serious
crimes of moral turpitude generally cast doubt upon a lawyer's fitness to
practice law.' As officers of the court, lawyers, even more than average
citizens, should demonstrate respect for the law.47 Lawyers who commit
serious crimes may lack the requisite moral fiber and emotional stability
to occupy positions of trust and responsibility.
In cases in which clients have consented to sexual relations with their
lawyers, the "adversely reflects" standard in DR 1-102(A)(6) arguably
may be the sole basis for sanctions. Presumably, initiating a consensual
sexual relationship with a client would not constitute illegal conduct in
most cases. Despite its open-endedness, most courts have been reluctant
to discipline attorneys based solely on a violation of the "adversely re-
flects" standard. In almost all disciplinary cases, courts have found that
the attorney also violated some other provision of the ethics rules, such
as those involving conflicts of interest, disclosure of confidential informa-
tion, or the likelihood that the attorney might be a witness against his
client.48
In Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith,49 a lawyer entered into an appar-
ently consensual sexual relationship with a client he represented in a pro-
43. See id at 477.
44. See id at 480-81.
45. Model Code, supra note 16, DR 1-102(A)(6).
46. For cases in which the court relied on both DR 1-102(A)(3) and (6), see In re
Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the
Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1989); In re Frick, 694 S.W.2d 473
(Mo. 1985) (en banc); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Fettner, 455 N.E.2d 1288 (Ohio 1983); In
re Discipline of Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856 (S.D. 1990). In one case the court relied only
on DR 1-102(A)(6) even though the lawyer had been convicted of fourth degree criminal
sexual assault arising indirectly from a lawyer-client relationship but not related to the
practice of law. See In re Addonizio, 469 A.2d 492, 492-93 (NJ. 1984).
47. "To lawyers especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude."
Model Code, supra note 16, EC 1-5.
48. See; eg., People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1991) (publicly reprimanding
attorney for engaging in sexual relations with client he represented in matrimonial matter
in part because that attorney may be called as witness); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith,
752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988) (publicly reprimanding attorney for professional misconduct
for his sexual involvement with client in part because that attorney disclosed confidential
information); In re Bowen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d
868 (N.Y. 1989) (suspending attorney for engaging in sexual relations or making sexual
advances to female clients in part because that attorney created conflict of interest).
49. 752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988).
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bate matter.50 Later the client discharged him and, in retaliation, the
lawyer sought to have the court remove her as guardian of her daugh-
ter.51 In the process he revealed to the court information that his client
had imparted to him in confidence.52 Finding that his conduct adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law and also violated the provisions on
conflicts of interest and client confidences, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reprimanded the lawyer for "his lack of professional judgment."53
The courts' reluctance to rely solely on the "adversely reflects" rule to
discipline attorneys follows from the amorphous nature of the rule. 4 Se-
vere dereliction of duty clearly reflects adversely on any lawyer's fitness
to practice law, but beyond that, it is difficult to know the parameters of
the concept. Fifty years ago some courts disciplined lawyers who en-
gaged in adulterous affairs with anyone, not simply with their clients.55
Under contemporary standards such behavior would not be deemed a
violation of professional ethics unless it directly impacted on the lawyer's
practice.5 6
An Iowa case similarly illustrates the difficulty of relying solely on the
50. See id.
51. See id. at 787.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 788.
54. In Wisconsin, rather than relying on the ethics rules, the referee in a disciplinary
proceeding sanctioned a lawyer who had made sexual advances toward his female clients
based on a violation of that state's Attorney's Oath, "by which an attorney swears to
'abstain from all offensive personality.'" In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Heilprin,
482 N.W.2d 908, 908 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 461 (1992). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court ultimately found it unnecessary to address the attorney's challenge that
the "offensive personality" language was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See id.
at 909. Instead the court sanctioned him based on a prior case in which the court disci-
plined the same attorney for rude behavior and sexual advances toward clients. See Id.
(referring to State v. Heilprin, 207 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1973)). Ironically, in the 1973
Heilprin case the court did not make the basis for discipline clear, but rather seemed to
rely on a general standard of unprofessional conduct. See State v. Heilprin, 207 N.W.2d
878, 882-83 (Wis. 1973).
Similarly, a panel from the Grievance Commission of the Maine Bar Association pub-
licly reprimanded a lawyer for "conduct unworthy of an attorney" for his having sug-
gested, supposedly jokingly, to a client filing for bankruptcy that she take her clothes off.
See Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Shankman, No. GV-91-S-277 (Me. Grievance
Comm'n, Feb. 22, 1993) (reprimanding attorney after public hearing held in Probate
Court). The board imposed discipline notwithstanding its finding that the conduct was
"'minor" and did not injure the client's legal interests in any way. See id. at 7-8. The
board felt that the psychic injury to the client, who was frightened and distressed by the
lawyer's "joke," was significant and justified a reprimand of the lawyer. See id. at 9.
For cases in which the court applied the "adversely reflects" standard under DR 1-
102(A)(6) with little or no explanation, see In re Kiley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 601, 601 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ressing, 559 N.E.2d 1359, 1359
(Ohio 1990).
55. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of Hartford County Bar v. Broder, 152 A. 292 (Conn.
1930) (disciplining unmarried lawyer for having adulterous relationship with married
non-client even though they married following her divorce).
56. See, e.g., In re Dalessandro, 397 A.2d 743, 758-59 (Pa. 1979) (refusing to disci-
pline married judge for having affair with married woman despite its allegedly "open and
notorious" nature).
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"adversely reflects" standard. In Committee on Professional Ethics &
Conduct of State Bar Ass'n v. Durham,57 the court reprimanded a female
attorney for fondling an incarcerated male client in the prison visitation
room." In disciplining the attorney, the Iowa Supreme Court relied on
DR 1-102(A)(6) and on two ethical considerations--one urging attor-
neys to be "temperate and dignified '" 9 and another prohibiting profes-
sional impropriety or the appearance thereofY° The attorney attacked
these provisions as unduly vague under due process standards. 6' The
court first found that the disciplinary rules were to be judged by the stan-
dard of the "reasonable attorney"-that is, whether the reasonable attor-
ney, as a learned professional, would understand what behavior was
prohibited.62 Applying that standard, the court held that a reasonable
attorney would understand that sexual contact with a client in this situa-
tion was intemperate, undignified, and professionally improper.63
Interestingly, the court struggled more with the constitutionality of
DR 1-102(A)(6) than with the ethical considerations. The court noted
bluntly that "[t]o state that an attorney should not do anything which
adversely reflects on his or her ability to practice does not provide a great
deal of guidance." ' The court found, however, that the applicable Ethi-
cal Considerations fleshed out the insubstantial nature of DR I-
102(A)(6) and, therefore, the attorney had sufficient warning of what be-
havior violated the rule.65 The court also made the blanket statement
that "[a]ny violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility necessar-
ily reflects adversely on the fitness of an attorney to practice law." 6'
The flaw in the Durham court's analysis was its failure to recognize
that aspirational nature of the Ethical Considerations of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility which, theoretically, do not serve as a di-
rect basis for discipline.67 The Code does not make clear that the court
must incorporate the entire body of Ethical Considerations into the "ad-
versely reflects" provision. It is therefore questionable whether due
57. 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979).
58. See id. at 281, 285-86.
59. See id. at 286 (relying on Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 1-5).
60. See id. (relying on Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 9-6).
61. See id. at 283.
62. The court reasoned that a less stringent "vagueness" standard than that applied
to criminal statutes was warranted because the ethics rules govern a more sophisticated
body of individuals than the general public. See id at 283-84.
63. See id at 284.
64. Iad
65. See ic
66. Id at 285.
67. The Preliminary Statement of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "[tihe Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive .... The Discipli-
nary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The Discipli-
nary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action." Model Code, supra note 16, Preliminary Statement.
68. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 1-102(A)(6).
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process was in fact satisfied where the court bootstrapped itself into DR
1-102(A)(6) by way of the Ethical Considerations regarding temperate
and proper behavior.
A Minnesota case further illustrates the lack of clarity in the "ad-
versely reflects" standard. In In re Discipline of Peters,69 the court found
that a law school dean created a "hostile" working and educational envi-
ronment by having made physical advances toward two female employ-
ees and two female students.70 The court publicly reprimanded the dean
for conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law under
DR 1-102(A)(6)." l The court imposed discipline despite the fact that the
dean's conduct did not stem from an attorney-client relationship and de-
spite his protests that none of his actions were overtly sexual in nature.7 2
Finally, courts have occasionally used Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules,
which prohibits "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice,"7, 3 or its counterpart under the Model Code, DR 1-102(A)(5)74 to
discipline lawyers who have attempted sexual relationships with their cli-
ents.75 In In re Liebowitz,7 6 the attorney's law firm had been assigned to
represent a pro bono client in custody litigation.7 7 When the client ar-
rived at the lawyer's office late one afternoon, the attorney invited her to
dinner and then to his apartment.78 The client accepted these invitations
so that she could discuss her case with the attorney.7 9 While at his apart-
ment, the attorney attempted to seduce his client and touched her sexu-
ally.8" After she protested several times, he allowed her to leave.81 The
69. 428 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1988).
70. See id. at 376-79.
71. See id. at 376.
72. See id. at 382. The dean argued that the complainants misconstrued his conduct,
which was neither sexually motivated nor wrongful. See id. His touches consisted
largely of putting his arm around the womens' rib cages or shoulders or stroking their
hair. See id. at 376-78. He claimed that he was a "tactile" person and that the complain-
ants had misunderstood his gestures. See id. at 382 (Popovich, J., concurring).
73. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d) (1992) [hereinafter Model
Rules].
74. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 1-102(A)(5).
75. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Goldsborough, 624 A.2d 503,
505 (Md. 1993) (suspending attorney for minimum of two years for spanking and kissing
two female clients and spanking legal secretary); In re Frick, 694 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Mo.
1985) (en banc) (disbarring attorney for conducting vendetta against ex-lover/client); In
re Bowen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46-47 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 868
(N.Y. 1989) (suspending attorney for two years for making sexual advances and engaging
in sexual relations with divorce clients); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Sopher, 852 P.2d
707, 711 (Okla. 1993) (reprimanding attorney for looking down blouses of client and her
mother while making offensive remark); In re Discipline of Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856,
856-57 (S.D. 1990) (suspending attorney for one year for initiating sexual relationships
with clients who believed fees would be eliminated or reduced in exchange).
76. 516 A.2d 246 (N.J. 1985).
77. See id. at 247.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board concluded that the lawyer vio-
lated DR 1-102(A)(5) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice."2 The Board found that the attorney's behavior had
"brought the pro bono matrimonial counsel program into disrepute.
8 3
As a consequence, the administration of justice would be hampered.8
2. Conflict of Interest
Where attorneys press unwilling clients for sexual favors, enter into
quid pro quo arrangements, or physically assault their clients, either DR
1-102 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility or Rule 8.4 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct may provide an adequate basis
upon which to sanction such unprofessional behavior.8" But when sexual
relationships are apparently consensual, it is doubtful whether courts can
discipline attorneys under the general misconduct rules.
In such cases state bar associations have resorted to the rules on con-
flict of interest to sanction attorneys on the theory that their personal
interest in their clients conflicts with their professional duty.8 6 Model
Code DR 5-101(A) provides that an attorney "shall not accept employ-
ment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client
will be or reasonably may be affected by his own . . . personal inter-
82. See id at 249. The Board emphasized the client's vulnerability and dependence
on the attorney, noting that she could easily have concluded that he would not ade-
quately represent her unless she acceded to the his sexual demands. See id. Because of
her poverty, she did not have the option to seek representation elsewhere. See id.
83. Ia In other words, prospective clients of the legal assistance program might lose
confidence in the program as a result of this incident and be reluctant to seek representa-
tion through it.
84. See id.
85. The Model Rules, by combining the "adversely reflects" provision of the Model
Code with the provision on illegal acts involving moral turpitude, are arguably less com-
prehensive than the Model Code, which forbids both illegal conduct involving moral tur-
pitude and any conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's ability to practice law.
Compare Model Code, supra note 16, DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(6) with Model
Rules, supra note 73, Rule 8.4(b). Under the Model Rules the attorney's behavior must
constitute a criminal act "that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 8.4(b). This
language certainly covers actual or attempted sexual assault of a client or quid pro quo
arrangements, but might not include either the lawyer's attempts to gain sexual favors
from an unwilling client without a physical assault or the lawyer's use of inappropriate
sexual language or innuendo toward a client.
In In re Wolf, 826 P.2d 628 (Or. 1992) (en banc), the court suspended an attorney for
eighteen months for committing a criminal act reflecting adversely on his fitness to prac-
tice law when he engaged in sexual intercourse with an underage client and served alco-
hol to her. See id He was later indicted on three criminal charges, and the Oregon
Supreme Court found that his conduct "show[ed] disrespect for the law, which the law-
yer has sworn to support ... and [bore] on the trustworthiness of a lawyer who is re-
tained to assist a vulnerable person." Id at 630. See also Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605
So. 2d 459, 460-61 (Fla. 1992) (disbarring attorney with prior record of discipline under
Model Rule 8.4(b) for masturbating in front of two clients).
86. See infra notes 96-99.
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ests." s The counterpart under the Model Rules, Rule 1.7, contains simi-
lar language except that it requires that representation of the client be
"materially limited" by the lawyer's own interests.88 Both rules allow
clients to waive the conflict by consent after disclosure, but Rule 1.7 al-
lows waiver only if, additionally, "the lawyer reasonably believes the rep-
resentation will not be adversely affected .... .""
Ideally, the interests of both attorneys and clients in the normal profes-
sional relationship are compatible, if not congruent. Clients' basic inter-
ests are to have their legal difficulties resolved as favorably and as
expeditiously as possible. In a strictly professional relationship attor-
neys' interests are to represent their clients vigorously and to ensure pay-
ment of fees. When attorneys develop amatory relationships with clients,
their self-interest potentially changes.90 Lawyers in that position may
not pursue their clients' interests vigorously out of fear that conclusion of
the legal matter would precipitate the end of their affair. In divorce cases
an attorney may be reluctant to support a possible reconciliation between
the client and his or her spouse. 91 In custody matters a lawyer who ends
up living with his client may urge her not to seek child custody.92
A Maryland State Bar Ethics Opinion posited the following scenario:
a client married to a man incapacitated by a stroke considered selling
certain jointly-owned real property, transferring property from her hus-
band to herself, and ultimately obtaining a divorce.93 The husband had
given the wife a power of attorney and had executed a will leaving all of
his assets to his wife.94 The children of the husband's first marriage were
likely to challenge the validity of the will.95 The possibilities for conflict
of interest if the attorney becomes sexually involved with the client are
rife in this situation. The attorney might encourage the client to transfer
property from her husband to herself in the hopes that he ultimately
might be the indirect beneficiary of such a transfer. The client's affair
with the attorney might cause her to obtain a divorce that she might not
have sought otherwise.
The conflict between attorneys' personal interests and clients' legal in-
87. Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-101(A).
88. See Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 1.7(b).
89. Id. at Rule 1.7(b)(1).
90. A lawyer's romantic involvement with a client may cloud his professional judg-
ment. Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules supplements the basic conflict of interest provisions
by requiring that a lawyer "exercise independent professional judgment" in representing
a client. Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 2.1. In one case the court held that a lawyer
who had a sexual liaison with a divorce client violated that rule by being unduly aggres-
sive in the divorce proceedings against the client's husband to the detriment of the client's
interests. See Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1056 (N.H. 1989).
91. See State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1987-92 (1988).
92. See id.
93. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 84-9 (1983).
94. See id.
95. See id.
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terests can be expressed in a number of different ways. Lawyers may
consciously pursue an unwise course of action on behalf of clients with
whom they are sexually involved.96 Sexual affairs with clients may affect
lawyers' judgment, directly impacting on the legal representation pro-
vided.9" Sexual involvement with clients may lead lawyers to commit
other ethical violations, such as disclosing confidential information" or
testifying as a witness against the client.99
Some courts have recognized potential conflicts between attorneys'
personal interests and clients' personal interests. In other words, lawyers
who initiate affairs or terminate them in an untimely manner may injure
emotionally-fragile clients. Married clients who consent to affairs of
which their spouses are unaware may later feel guilt and remorse. Cli-
ents having affairs with their lawyers conceivably could become emotion-
ally dependent on them leading to depression, anxiety, and lowered self-
esteem if the lawyers end the affair." In Drucker's Case,10 a lawyer
abruptly terminated an affair with a client filing for divorce who suffered
from an anxiety disorder.10 2 As a result, the client "felt that it was an-
other rejection in her life, but remained hopeful that [the lawyer's] feel-
ings for her would change and that he would be attracted to her once
again., 0 3
96. See, e.g., Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1054 (N.H. 1989) (attorney requested
contested hearing for his client's divorce without her knowledge or approval).
97. See e.g., In re Bowen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 545
N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1989) (suspending attorney for two years for sexual advances toward
matrimonial client seeking child custody); In re Ridgeway, 462 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Wis.
1990) (suspending attorney for attempting to seduce client he represented in probation
matter and for offering her beer knowing that consumption of alcohol violated her proba-
tion conditions).
An actual compromise of the attorney's professional judgment in representing the cli-
ent is not necessary to create a conflict of interest. Rather, it is sufficient if "the exercise
of his professional judgment on his clients' behalf reasonably might have been affected by
his personal interest." In re Wolf, 826 P.2d 628, 631 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (emphasis
added).
98. See, eg., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith, 752 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1988) (find-
ing attorney violated Code of Professional Responsibility by becoming sexually involved
with client he represented in probate and guardianship matter and by disclosing that
client's confidences).
99. See, eg., People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (expressing
concern that sexual relations with client being represented in dissolution or custody pro-
ceeding could lead to attorney being called as witness against client).
100. One author has explored the deep psychic injuries experienced by women who
have affairs with trusted authority figures:
Although it may take decades for [the woman] to appreciate fully the betrayal,
loss, and damage emanating from the moment of sexual contact in the forbid-
den zone, she has in that moment been returned to the state of woundedness in
which she entered this man's presence. Furthermore, she has been returned to
it with hope itself destroyed. Many women never recover.
Rutter, supra note 5, at 155 (1989).
101. 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990).
102. See id at 1199.
103. Id In addition to the conflict of interest provisions, the court found that the
attorney violated Model Rule 1.8(b) by using the confidential information imparted by
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Clients can waive the conflict of interest by consenting to the represen-
tation after full disclosure of the conflict."° The Model Rules require
additionally that the attorney "reasonably [believe] the representation
will not be adversely affected." 1°5 It is possible, therefore, that lawyers
could explain to their clients the potentially adverse consequences of
combining a personal and professional relationship and then could obtain
consent to the arrangement. 0 6 Under the Model Rules lawyers would
also have to believe in their ability to represent their clients' best interests
despite their personal involvement."0 7 One court considered the waiver
possibility rather far-fetched, noting, "[w]e need not concern ourselves
with a bizarre hypothesis that leads to the absurd."' ' In other words, it
is unrealistic to expect that a lawyer and a client in the thrall of sexual
passion would be able to sit down and discuss the possible conflict of
interest problems engendered by their sexual affair, ultimately reducing
the client's waiver to writing.
Related to the basic conflict of interest provision is the rule mandating
withdrawal as counsel in anticipated or pending litigation when it ap-
pears likely that the lawyer will be called as a witness in the proceed-
ing.'0 9 Lawyers who may be called as witnesses on behalf of their clients
may not continue their representation except in certain limited circum-
stances where their testimony relates to an uncontested matter or where
their services are uniquely valuable in the particular case." 0 Attorneys
who may be called as witnesses other than on behalf of their clients may
the client about her emotional fragility to her disadvantage. See id. at 1202. The court
also held that the lawyer violated Rule 1.14(a) by failing to maintain a normal attorney-
client relationship with a client who had a known mental disability. See id. at 1202-03.
104. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-101(A); Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule
1.7(b).
105. Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 1.7(b)(1).
106. See, e.g., Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1057 (N.H. 1989) (noting that attorney-
client sexual relations may be permissible with client's consent if attorney reasonably
believes representation will not be affected).
107. See Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 1.7(b)(1).
108. In re Lewis, 415 S.E.2d 173, 175 n.l (Ga. 1992) (per curiam).
109. See Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 3.7.
110. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-101(B); Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule
3.7(a). The Model Code provides:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a law-
yer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a
witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial
and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial, except that he
may continue the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify in the
circumstances enumerated in DR 5-101(B)(1) through (4).
Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-102(A).
The Code identifies the circumstances under which attorneys can accept employment
in contemplated or pending litigation where it is likely that they or a lawyer in their firm
may be called as a witness as follows:
(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony.
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continue the representation "until it is apparent that [their] testimony is
or may be prejudicial to [their] client." ''
State bar disciplinary and ethics boards have recognized that attorneys
who have affairs with clients that they represent in divorce actions might
be called as witnesses in their clients' cases, often on behalf of the oppos-
ing party."1 2 The husband in a contested divorce may seek to prove his
wife's extramarital affair in order to limit his responsibility for alimony
or to affect property division, child custody, or visitation rights." 3 In
some states the existence of an extramarital liaison is not relevant to the
divorce itself or to these collateral issues, but in many states it is." I 4 Even
where the affair by itself would not be relevant to child custody, it might
demonstrate, coupled with other facts, an undesirable home
environment.' 1 5
Any information conveyed to lawyers by their clients as part of the
professional relationship is protected by the attorney-client privilege." 6
A party in a marital dispute, however, could subpoena the opposing at-
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client.(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the cli-
ent because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the
particular case.
Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-101(B).
The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility treat this issue in substantially similar
fashion. The "substantial hardship" exception may be asserted for any reason, however,
not merely the "distinctive value" of the legal services. Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule
3.7(a)(3).
111. Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-102(B). Rule 3.7(b) of the Model Rules also
supports this proposition. See Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 3.7(b).
112. See In re Rudnick, 581 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Maryland State
Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 84-9 (1983).
113. See, eg., In re Lewis, 415 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. 1992) (per curiarn) (suspending
attorney for three years for engaging in sexual relations with client while representing her
in divorce and custody proceedings even if sexual relationship pre-existed professional
relationship); Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1057 (N.H. 1989) (disbarring attorney for
having sexual relationship with client, soliciting intimate details of her sexual life, and
manipulating her while representing her in divorce proceeding).
114. Several state statutes specify that the courts must consider the parties' misconduct
in deciding matters such as property division and alimony. See. eg., Ala. Code § 30-2-52(1989) (providing allowance upon grant of divorce for misconduct); Md. Code Ann.,
Fain. Law §§ 8-205(4), 11-106 (1991) (both provisions allowing consideration of circum-
stances of estrangement); Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-107.1, .3 (Michie 1990) (§ 20-107.1 al-
lowing consideration of circumstances of divorce in determining award of support and
maintenance and § 20-107.3 allowing same in determining property division). For cases
considering a nonmarital affair as adversely affecting child custody, see, eg., Bell v. Bell,
267 S.E.2d 894 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (awarding custody to father because mother was
living with man to whom she was not married); Shanklin v. Shanklin, 376 So. 2d 1036(La. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing court to deny custody to mother who consistently engaged
in open and public sexual conduct contrary to generally accepted moral principles).
115. See generally Annotation, Custodial Parent's Sexual Relations with Third Person
as Justifying Modification of Child Custody Order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980 & Supp. 1992)(discussing effect of custodial parent's sexual relations with third parties on child custody
orders).
116. See 1 McCormick on Evidence § 88, at 322-26 (4th ed. 1992).
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torney to testify regarding any matter arising out of his personal relation-
ship with his client relevant to the divorce and related issues. 117 Under
existing ethics rules the attorney could not continue to represent his cli-
ent because of the "obviously embarrassing predicament of testifying and
then having to argue the credibility and effect of his own testimony."1 18
Thus the client would be left suddenly without representation at the
same time she had to endure hearing testimony of her former attorney
about the details of their personal life.
3. Prejudice or Injury to the Client
Model Code DR 7-101(A)(3) prohibits lawyers from intentionally
prejudicing or damaging their clients during the course of the profes-
sional relationship.119 Although the Model Rules do not have a precise
counterpart to this provision, several related provisions can be read col-
lectively to prohibit attorneys from intentionally harming their clients.120
Disciplinary boards in some states have found that attorneys involved in
sexual relationships with their clients have violated these rules by harm-
ing the clients' legal interests or psychological well-being.1 21
Attorneys' amatory relationships with their clients can prejudice the
clients' legal interests in at least two ways: first, the mere existence of
the relationship may affect the clients' legal position, as in a divorce ac-
tion; second, attorneys who are rebuffed by their clients may retaliate in a
manner that harms the clients' legal interests. In In re McDow,1 22 coun-
sel began an adulterous affair with a client seeking a divorce.1 23 As a
117. See In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 13 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (Greiman, J.,
specially concurring).
118. Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-102 n.31 (quoting Galarowicz v. Ward, 230
P.2d 576, 580 (Utah 1951)).
119. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 7-101(A)(3). The only exception to this rule
is where clients have perpetrated frauds upon a person or tribunal. If clients refuse or are
unable to reveal the fraud themselves, then their attorneys must do so, "except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication." Id. DR 7-102(B)(I).
120. For example, attorneys whose poor judgment or retaliatory motives resulted in
harm to their clients' legal interests would violate the Model Rules which require lawyers
to provide "competent representation to a client." Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 1.1.
Cf. Model Code, supra note 16, DR 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting "[n]eglect of a legal mat-
ter"). Similarly, Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules requires attorneys to "act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client." Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 1.3.
121. The Model Rules place additional restrictions on actions that might harm clients'
interests, providing that "[a] lawyer shall not use information relating to representation
of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation
S.. ." Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule 1.8(b). Cf Model Code, supra note 16, DR 4-
l0l(B)(2) (containing similar language). In Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052 (N.H. 1989),
the court found that the lawyer had used the confidences imparted by a client he repre-
sented in a divorce proceeding about her marital difficulties and his consequent knowl-
edge of her vulnerability to seduce her in violation of Rule 1.8(b). See id. at 1056; see also
Otis' Case, 609 A.2d 1199, 1204 (N.H. 1992) (disbarring attorney for attempting to se-
duce emotionally and financially vulnerable divorce client).
122. 354 S.E.2d 383 (S.C. 1987).
123. See id.
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result, the family court judge granted her husband a divorce on the
ground of adultery.124 Conceivably, the client's "fault" in the divorce
action adversely affected the property division, the award of alimony, or
the granting of child custody. The South Carolina Supreme Court repri-
manded the attorney for prejudicing and damaging his client during the
representation. 125
The attorney in McDow probably did not intend the adverse conse-
quences to his client, but in other cases lawyers have deliberately acted
against their client's legal interests or have threatened to do so. In Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith, 26 for example, the lawyer, after his client-
lover discharged him, filed an affidavit with the court seeking removal of
the client as guardian of her daughter.' 27 Similarly, in a New York case
a lawyer threatened to abandon his client's case if she terminated their
sexual affair and suggested that she might lose custody of her son.' 28
In addition to damaging their legal interests, actual or attempted sex-
ual relationships with attorneys potentially harm clients' emotional well-
being.1 29 An unwanted sexual advance, even if successfully rebuffed, can
cause clients to lose confidence in their attorneys, to feel betrayed by
someone expected to protect their interests, and to experience emotional
turmoil. 3 ' Clients may submit to the sexual demands of their lawyers
because of fear 3 ' and, subsequently, feel humiliated and disgusted with
themselves and with their lawyers. Finally, clients who consciously de-
sire affairs with their attorneys may be acting out of vulnerability and
need rather than free choice.' 2
124. See id at 383-84.
125. See id at 384.
126. 752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988).
127. See id at 787.
128. See In re Rudnick, 581 N.Y.S.2d 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
129. An Alaska Bar Association Ethics Opinion states that an attorney should not
initiate a sexual relationship with a client "[w]here the client is in an emotionally fragile
condition, and the sexual relationship may have an adverse affect [sic] on the client's
emotional stability." Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 88-1 (1988). In a subsequent formal
opinion the Alaska Bar Association extended the prohibition to situations in which the
"client is involved in a legal matter of the type that is generally recognized to be emotion-
ally charged." Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 92-6 (1992). Both opinions enumerate addi-
tional circumstances, such as coercion or the possibility that the attorney would be called
as a witness in the client's case, in which an intimate relationship with the client would be
unethical.
130. See, eg., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Woodmansee, 434 N.W.2d 94
(Wis. 1989) (per curiam) (suspending attorney for sexual advances made toward client
who became suicidally depressed as a result).
131. See eg., People v. Gibbons, 685 P.2d 168, 175 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (disbarring
attorney who "blackmailed" client into having sexual relations as condition of represent-
ing her and her husband in criminal proceedings); see also Woman Victorious in Client-
Sex Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1992, at A38 (describing client who submitted to sexual
advances out of fear that otherwise lawyer would intentionally lose her case).
132. See eg., Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
Ass'n v. Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1989) (suspending attorney for agreeing to quid
pro quo arrangement with client who was drug addicted, emotionally unstable, and finan-
cially strapped).
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4. Penalties
Disciplinary bodies impose penalties on attorneys who engage in sex-
ual misconduct toward their clients that run the gamut from slight to
severe,1 33 ranging from a public reprimand 134 to suspensions of varying
lengths135 to disbarment. 136 Differences in the severity of misconduct,
the presence of mitigating or aggravating factors, and the lawyer's prior
ethical history as a member of the bar may account for some of this
variation in punishment. But, in many cases, members of disciplinary
bodies may simply hold widely divergent views concerning the serious-
ness of attorney sexual misconduct.
Although some variation in penalties is unavoidable, and not necessar-
ily undesirable, it is clear that some state courts and bar associations
regard sexual misconduct by attorneys toward their clients more seri-
ously than others. In Indiana, counsel received only a public reprimand
for physically assaulting a client by grabbing her, kissing her, and raising
her blouse. 137 In New Mexico, however, the court disbarred an attorney
after he pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of attempted criminal sex-
ual contact with a client. 138
Although almost all disciplinary bodies and ethics boards agree that
quid pro quo arrangements, either actual or attempted, are improper and
embarrassing to the profession, the choice of sanction betrays a curiously
schizophrenic attitude. In In re Conduct of Howard,139 the Oregon Dis-
ciplinary Review Board recommended dismissal of charges against a law-
133. The American Bar Association, in developing its standards for imposing lawyer
discipline, observed that inconsistent and inappropriate sanctions against attorney mis-
conduct have great potential to undermine confidence in the efficiency and fairness of the
disciplinary system. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 119, at 01:801 (June 17, 1992).
134. See, e.g., In re Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786, 787 (Ind. 1981) (publicly reprimanding
attorney for physically assaulting client). According to one source, those cases in which
the discipline board issues a private reprimand will not be in the public records unless the
attorney appeals the decision. See Interview with Vincent F. Vitullo, Special Counsel for
Adjudication, Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 14, 1993).
135. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 415 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Ga. 1992) (per curiam) (suspending
attorney for three years); Hill, 436 N.W.2d at 59 (suspending attorney for three months);
In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (suspending attorney for six
months); In re Bowen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 868
(N.Y. 1989) (suspending attorney for two years); Carter v. Kritz, 560 A.2d 360, 361 (R.I.
1989) (per curiam) (suspending attorney for one year); In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Wood, 363 N.W.2d 220 (Wis. 1985) (suspending attorney for 60 days).
136. See, e.g., Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1059 (N.H. 1989) (disbarring attorney
for engaging in consensual sexual relationship with client); In re Stanton, 708 P.2d 325,
326 (N.M. 1985) (disbarring attorney for attempting criminal sexual contact with female
client).
137. See Adams, 428 N.E.2d at 787.
138. See In re Stanton, 708 P.2d at 326. Although the court did not provide the details
of the crime in the second case, the court referred to similar "sexual advances" made to
another client. See id.
139. 681 P.2d 775 (Or. 1984) (en banc).
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yer who had engaged in sexual intercourse with a prostitute in lieu of a
fee." Noting that the lawyer himself had actually been convicted of
prostitution because of this incident, the Oregon Supreme Court assessed
a public reprimand. 41 Similarly, a lawyer in Iowa received only a three-
month suspension for agreeing to have sexual intercourse with a client
who could not pay the fee.142 By contrast, the court in In re Wood first
suspended the lawyer for one year for exchanging services for sex 14 3 and
then ultimately disbarred him after a second offense ten years later.'"'
Consensual sexual relationships between lawyers and their clients, as
one might anticipate, have resulted in a wide range of sanctions reflecting
the deep division within the profession about their propriety. In Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith,1 45 the lawyer in a probate case had an ap-
parently consensual sexual relationship with his client.146 The Kentucky
Supreme Court issued only a public reprimand, with three justices dis-
senting on the grounds that no charges should have been brought against
the attorney.147 Similarly, in In re McDow,148 an attorney received only a
public reprimand even though his adulterous affair with his female client
caused the family court to grant her husband's request for a divorce
based on adultery.1 49 Neither the obvious conflict of interest nor the
clear damage to the client's interests struck the court as warranting a
more severe penalty.
By contrast, the court in a recent Georgia case, In re Lewis,' 5 ° sus-
pended for three years an attorney who initiated an affair with a client
seeking a divorce even though she failed to establish either a quid pro quo
arrangement or coercion." The court emphasized the potential conflict
of interest problems and chastised the lawyer for risking possible injury
to his client's interests in the dissolution action.' s2 As in the Meredith
case cited above, three justices dissented, but this time on the basis that
the penalty was too lenient and that the lawyer should have been
140. See id at 775-76. One may speculate that the Disciplinary Review Board's casual
attitude toward the misconduct can be attributed to the fact that the client was a known
prostitute.
141. See id at 776.
142. See Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v.
Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1989).
143. See In re Wood, 358 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 1976); see also People v. Crossman,
850 P.2d 708, 712 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (suspending attorney for one year and one day
for soliciting sexual favors in exchange for reduction of legal fees on three separate occa-
sions with three different prospective clients).
144. See In re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. 1986).
145. 752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988).
146. See id at 787.
147. See id
148. 354 S.E.2d 383 (S.C. 1987).
149. See id at 383-84.
150. 415 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 1992) (per curiam).
151. See id at 174-75.
152. See id at 175.
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disbarred.153
The court imposed disbarment as the penalty in Bourdon's Case,"5 4 in
which the attorney had engaged in a consensual sexual affair with a client
seeking a divorce.15 In an unrelated incident the attorney also inade-
quately represented another client by failing to inform him of his crimi-
nal conviction, of his appeal rights, and of his obligation to obey the
court's orders. 156 The court held that the two incidents together justified
disbarment and particularly criticized the attorney's "calculated abuse of
[the divorce client's] trust. ' 157
Unquestionably, members of the legal profession disagree about
whether lawyers who initiate sexual affairs with their clients commit seri-
ous breaches of professional ethics.158 Although a number of state bar
associations have disciplined attorneys for sexual misconduct involving
their clients, some have felt that a minor penalty sufficiently displayed
the bar's displeasure with such conduct.159 The divergence in opinion
about what constitutes sufficient punishment for what one judge called
the profession's "dirty little secret"' 6 supports the need for a specific
153. See id. at 176.
154. 565 A.2d 1052, 1059 (N.H. 1989).
155. See id. at 1054.
156. See id. at 1057-58.
157. Id. at 1059.
158. Three ethics opinions issued by the Oregon State Bar within the last thirteen years
illustrate the wide divergence of opinion concerning the propriety of attorney-client sex-
ual relations. Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Opinion 429, issued in 1979, concludes that
there is no per se ethical violation when attorneys engage in sexual relations with their
clients in divorce actions provided that the divorce does not involve children and is predi-
cated upon an amicable settlement or a default proceeding. See Oregon State Bar, Legal
Ethics Op. 429 (1979). Three years later the Oregon State Bar Board of Governors with-
drew this opinion and replaced it with an opinion making it unethical for lawyers to
become sexually involved with their divorce clients regardless of the circumstances. See
Oregon State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 475 (1982). Finally, an opinion issued in 1991 dis-
cards this strict prohibition and concludes that sexual affairs with divorce clients may
damage them under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(3) and
most likely create a conflict of interest under Model Code DR 5-101(A). See Oregon
State Bar, Formal Op. 1991-99 (1991). The opinion indicates, however, that in cases
where no prejudice exists, attorneys can circumvent the conflict of interest problem by
fully disclosing the possible conflict to their clients and by obtaining their valid consent.
See id.
159. See, e.g., In re Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981) (publicly reprimanding attor-
ney for sexual misconduct); In re McDow, 354 S.E.2d 383 (S.C. 1987) (same).
160. See In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Greiman, J.,
specially concurring).
The court in In re Bellino, 417 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1992), expressed its contempt for
attorneys who prey upon vulnerable clients by forcing sexual attentions on them:
This case is not about sex or sex abuse. It is about power-the awesome power
that comes with the license to practice law-and the abuse thereof. A certain
amount of courage is required for a person to make romantic overtures to an-
other person. The fear of rejection is legitimate, and the pain of rejection is real.
Some people find ways to cheat and, thereby, avoid the possibility of rejection.
One way is by the use of a prostitute. Another and even more reprehensible
way is by taking advantage of a weaker person, a person either physically
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rule regulating attorney-client sexual relationships. Some clearer indica-
tion of when such relationships are not in the best interests of clients
might lead to a more even-handed administration of discipline in this
area.
B. Civil Suits
A number of former clients have brought civil actions against their
attorneys to recover for professional malpractice or for personal injuries
based on the attorneys' actual or attempted sexual involvement with
them. Plaintiffs in these cases have sought damages based on a variety of
theories, including battery and misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
1. Battery and Misrepresentation
In Barbara A. v. John G.,1 61 a client sued her former attorney for bat-
tery and misrepresentation. 162 The plaintiff had hired the attorney to
represent her in a post-dissolution proceeding involving modification of
spousal and child support. 63 The lawyer initiated a sexual affair with
her and, in response to her concerns about birth control, assured her that
he could not impregnate her."6 Assuming that he was sterile, the client
agreed to the affair. 6 ' The attorney's statement regarding his infertility
was knowingly false, however, and the client became pregnant as a result
of the affair.
166
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's cross-complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.' 67 The California appellate court reversed, hold-
ing that the plaintiff had plead sufficient facts, which, if proven, would
support claims for battery 168 and deceit.' 69 Even without the attorney-
weaker or, as the result of circumstances, less able to say no. This is precisely
what [the respondent lawyer] did.
Id at 537.
161. 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
162. See id. at 425. The client's action against the attorney was brought as a cross-
complaint after the attorney sued her for fees for representing her in a post-dissolution
proceeding. See id.
163. See id at 426.
164. See id
165. See id.
166. See id. The pregnancy was ectopic, and the client was ultimately rendered sterile
following emergency surgery to save her life. See id.
167. See id at 425. The client also pleaded counts alleging intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress and legal malpractice. See id. The trial court also dis-
missed these counts, but the client apparently did not appeal those dismissals. See id.
168. See id. at 426. In support of her battery claim, the plaintiff needed to show "an
unconsented invasion of her interest in freedom from intentional, unlawful, and harmful
or offensive contact with her person." Id. Although the plaintiff technically consented to
sexual intercourse with the defendant, she argued both that the defendant's impregnating
her exceeded the scope of the consent and that her consent was fraudulently induced. See
id
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client relationship, the plaintiff's assertion of the facts justified these
claims. The court was reluctant to take the next step, however, and to
state that the fiduciary relationship bore directly on the battery and de-
ceit claims.
The court noted that the parties' fiduciary relationship conceivably
was relevant to elements of both claims based on the presumption that
the party in whom trust and confidence is placed exerts undue influence
over the other party.170 Undue influence bears both on the consent ele-
ment of the battery claim and on the justifiable reliance element of the
deceit claim.'71 Thus, although conceding that the fiduciary relationship
bore on the plaintiff's claims, the court refused to declare as a matter of
law that an attorney-client relationship imposed on the attorney a fiduci-
ary duty with respect to the client in their personal, as well as their pro-
fessional, relations.1 72 The court left open the possibility, however, that
the client could prove that a confidential, as distinguished from a fiduci-
ary, relationship existed between the two parties in their personal deal-
ings.17 3 Once the plaintiff demonstrates the existence of such a
relationship, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove certain elements
of the battery and deceit claims. 174
The court also declined to address whether it is a breach of ethics for
attorneys to induce clients to have sexual relationships during the course
of representation, leaving the regulation of such conduct to the State Bar
of California. 175 With respect to both the fiduciary relationship issue and
the ethics issue, the court evidently was reluctant to create a "chilling
and far-reaching effect on any personal relations between an attorney and
his or her clients." 176
169. See id. To sustain a claim for deceit the plaintiff needed to show "(1) a false
representation (ordinarily of a fact) made by the defendant; (2) knowledge or belief on the
part of the defendant that the representation is false, or that the representation was made
by defendant without reasonable grounds for believing its truth; (3) an intention to induce
the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation; (4)
justifiable reliance upon the representation by the plaintiff; (5) damage to the plaintiff,
resulting from such reliance." Id. at 427 (citations omitted).
170. See id. at 432.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. Like the fiduciary relationship, the confidential relationship involves one
party's imposing trust and confidence in the other party, who then is in a position to exert
undue influence over the first party. See id. As legally recognized confidential relation-
ships, fiduciary relationships are in a sense a subset of confidential relationships. See id.
at 431. Confidential relationships, however, do not necessarily arise from a legal relation-
ship but can grow out of a moral obligation, social custom, or a personal understanding
between two parties. See id.
174. See id. at 432. The defendant would then have to prove in the battery claim that
the plaintiff gave free and informed consent to physical contact or in the deceit claim that
the plaintiff was not justified in relying on the defendant's statements about his infertility.
See id.
175. See id. at 433.
176. Id. at 432-33.
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2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The plaintiff in Suppressed v. Suppressed,'7 a recent Illinois case, more
directly pursued the claim for breach of fiduciary duty alluded to in Bar-
bara A. v. John G. In Suppressed, a divorce client sued her former attor-
ney for seducing or coercing her into a sexual relationship during his
representation of her.77 Because the two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions had expired, the plaintiff made a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty, which has a five-year statute of limitations.' 7 9 The Illi-
nois appellate court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint.1
8 0
The court stated that the client did not sufficiently plead the elements
of breach of fiduciary duty or legal malpractice: (1) a duty owed by the
attorney to the client arising from their professional relationship; (2)
breach of that duty; and (3) actual damages suffered by plaintiff as a
proximate result of the breach.' 8" The court noted that the plaintiff
failed to plead adequately facts relating to the first and third elements.'8 2
The court refused to extend the attorney's duty of good faith and fair
177. 565 N.E.2d 101 (III. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (IMI. 1991). It
is not clear from the opinion why the parties' names were suppressed in this case. The
defendant obtained an order from the chancery court requiring suppression of the names
and impoundment of the court record. See id. at 102. Probably, the attorney sought the
order to protect his reputation. Interestingly, the plaintiff did not desire anonymity, as do
many victims in sexual assault cases, and later revealed her identity in a number of press
interviews. See Mary Wisniewski, Sex With Clients an Unfair Affair, Chi. Daily L Bull.,
Apr. 20, 1991, at 1.
The law firm defendant in Suppressed and in a later federal case, Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d
763 (7th Cir. 1992), involving the same defendants and similar allegations, subsequently
gave up its anonymity when it sued the attorney and the legal clinic representing the
plaintiffs in these cases. The law firm alleged that the attorney and the legal clinic had
harassed the law firm and had violated legal ethics by improperly soliciting clients. See
William Grady et al., NU Clinic Collides with Rinella Firm, Chi. Trib., July 28, 1992, at
C3. This suit was dismissed in September 1992. See William Grady et al., Sybaris Says
Bank Left It at the Altar, Chi. Trib., Sept. 22, 1992, at C3.
178. See Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 102. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that, after
she had retained the defendant as her attorney in a divorce action, he demanded and
received oral sex from her and later, on more than one occasion, took her to an apartment
where he asked that she inhale an intoxicating substance and submit to sexual intercourse
with him. See id She alleged that she complied with defendant's demands for sex be-
cause of her fear that otherwise defendant would not vigorously represent her and her
children. See id at 102-03.
179. See id at 103. The plaintiff also attempted to argue that the longer statute of
limitations should apply to her personal injury action because the defendant fraudulently
concealed the existence of the conflict of interest that ultimately gave rise to the injury.
See icL at 104. The appellate court refused to decide this issue because the plaintiff failed
to raise it before the trial court. See id at 106. The court commented, however, that "it
is highly improbable that we would find that a defendant could have fraudulently con-
cealed a personal injury cause of action from a plaintiff, due [to] the very nature of a
personal injury action." Id at 107.
180. See id
181. See id at 104.
182. See id The court's analysis suggests that plaintiff's complaint was insufficient on
all three elements.
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dealing toward his client to their personal relationship.18 As long as the
attorney's behavior in the personal relationship did not affect his profes-
sional activity, no actionable claim for breach of fiduciary duty arose.I84
Additionally, the plaintiff did not allege actual damages as a result of
the defendant's actions apart from intangibles such as shame, humilia-
tion, and emotional distress."8 5 She did not plead that the sexual rela-
tionship interfered with the attorney's competence or the adequacy of his
representation of her, causing her pecuniary harm in her divorce ac-
tion.18 6 Permitting her intangible injury in the form of emotional distress
to replace proof of actual damages would circumvent the statutory limi-
tations on such claims as criminal conversation and alienation of
affections. 187
The Illinois appellate court in Suppressed was clearly reluctant to tread
in uncharted waters by holding that clients seduced by their attorneys
could state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty without any concrete
showing of injury to their legal or financial interests.""8 The court feared
a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship, a flood of unjustified
claims resulting from dissatisfaction with attorneys, and the possibility of
183. See id. at 105. The court stated:
if we were to accept plaintiff's contention that defendant in this case breached a
fiduciary duty arising from the attorney-client relationship, we would be creat-
ing a new species of legal malpractice action and we would necessarily be hold-
ing that inherent in every attorney-client contract there is a duty to refrain from
intimate personal relationships. Plaintiff can cite no support for this proposi-
tion, nor do we believe that any exists.
Id. at 104-05.
184. See id. at 105.
185. See id. at 105-06.
186. See id. at 106. Another recent case illustrates the difficulties of recovering in a
malpractice action for sexual harassment. See Alexander Peters, Malpractice Verdict
Thrown Out, The Recorder, Aug. 13, 1992, at 4. A client sued his attorney for malprac-
tice, alleging that the attorney tried to pressure him into having sex with him in exchange
for providing representation and even attempted to assault him physically while he was
asleep. See id. The trial judge threw out the jury verdict for the plaintiff and directed a
verdict for the defendant. See id. The court apparently concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to prove that the attorney's representation of him was either inadequate or failed to
meet the appropriate standard of care. See id.
By contrast, a Rhode Island jury recently found that an attorney who exploited his
position to coerce sex from his client was liable for malpractice as well as for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, battery, and fraud. See ArLynn Leiber Presser, Lawyer
Liable for Coerced Sex, 79 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 24. The jury verdict, which the
lawyer is appealing, came in the face of evidence that the attorney was entirely successful
in obtaining the relief desired by the client in her divorce action. See id. If the court
upholds the verdict on appeal, this will become the first case in which a plaintiff has
prevailed on a malpractice claim involving a lawyer-client sexual relationship where there
was no proof of injury to the client's legal interests or of attorney incompetence.
187. See Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 106 n.3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ap-
peal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. 1991). In Illinois plaintiffs bringing suit for alienation of
affections or criminal conversation may recover only their actual damages and are barred
from receiving punitive damages or damages for mental anguish or injured feelings. See
Ill. Comp. Laws Ann. ch. 40, §§ 1900-07, 1950-57 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
188. See Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d at 106.
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clients' attempts to blackmail attorneys. 8 9 The court suggested that the
legislature was the appropriate body to create a new civil cause of action
for sexual exploitation of clients by their attorneys, akin to the statutory
cause of action that Illinois and other states have created for psychother-
apists' sexual abuse of their patients.1 90
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In a recent California case, McDaniel v. Gile,19' the court further ex-
plored the fiduciary duty theory raised in Suppressed v. Suppressed. The
attorney in McDaniel sued his client for unpaid fees, and the client coun-
terclaimed for malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.1 92 The trial court summarily adjudicated certain issues on the
cross-complaint in favor of the attorney' 9 and later granted judgment in
favor of the attorney on the claim for fees. 19
4
On appeal the California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
summary adjudication of the issues on the cross-complaint and held that
the client, in her cross-complaint, had alleged facts sufficient to support
her claim. 195 The client alleged that she had consulted the lawyer re-
garding her divorce action and that, during the course of his representa-
tion of her, he made sexual advances and sexually provocative remarks to
her.196 When she spurned his advances, he stopped answering her tele-
phone calls, told her that she should "play[ ] the game the right way,"' 9 7
and erroneously advised her that she had no community property inter-
est in her husband's retirement plan.198
The appellate court held that the lawyer's fiduciary duty toward his
client was relevant to both the malpractice' 99 and the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims.2 "o The attorney's neglect of a client's
interests caused by a sexual rebuff can constitute a breach of the attor-
ney's fiduciary duty, which includes the duty to exercise the skill and
189. See id. at 106 n.3.
190. See id at 106.
191. 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
192. See id at 244.
193. See iL The lower court found that the defendant client could not state a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or legal malpractice based on the
plaintiff lawyer's alleged sexual advances. See id Additionally, the court held that § 43.5
of the California Civil Code disallowing a seduction action by a consenting adult barred
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id
194. See id at 245.
195. See id at 248-49. The court remanded the case for retrial of the entire action.
See i d at 250.
196. See id at 245.
197. Id at 245-46.
198. See id
199. A legal malpractice claim is predicated upon the traditional tort notions of duty,
breach of duty, causation, and damages. See id at 249 (citing Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d
433 (Cal. 1971)).
200. See id
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diligence of a lawyer of average competence. 20 ' Further the attorney's
unwelcome sexual advances toward the client, together with his aban-
donment of her if proven, would constitute "outrageous" conduct, one of
the required elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.20 2 The court judged the outrageousness of the defendant's con-
duct in light of the parties' relationship. 0 3 Attorneys are in positions of
authority with respect to their clients and, in many cases, are aware of
their clients' vulnerability and dependency. 204 As fiduciaries, attorneys
must act "with the most conscientious fidelity ' 205 toward their clients.
Therefore "[tlhe withholding by a retained attorney of legal services
when sexual favors are not granted by a client and engaging in sexual
harassment of the client are outrageous conduct under these
circumstances." 20 6
In contrast to Suppressed, the court in McDaniel at least allowed the
client to establish her breach of fiduciary duty claim at trial.20 7 This
divergence in result, however, may be attributed largely to the factual
differences between the cases. In Suppressed, the client did not assert
that the attorney's sexual conduct in any way affected his representation
of her legal interests20 whereas, in McDaniel, the client pleaded that her
attorney had abandoned her after she refused his sexual advances.20 9
The court in McDaniel stated flatly that "[w]e specifically do not address
whether sexual relations between an attorney and client constitute a per
se violation of the fiduciary relationship. ' 210 Thus it is likely that, given
the facts of Suppressed, the California appellate court would have
reached the same result on the claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
201. See id.
202. The other elements of the claim include (1) an intent to cause emotional distress
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing it; (2) severe emotional distress; and (3)
actual and proximate causation of plaintiff's emotional distress by defendant's conduct.
See id. at 247 (citing Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979)).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Id. A Rhode Island jury recently awarded a plaintiff compensatory and punitive
damages against her former attorney for, among other claims, intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See Woman Victorious in Client-Sex Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29,
1992, at A38. Unlike the situation in McDaniel, the plaintiff in this case testified that the
attorney did an excellent job of representing her in her divorce action, notwithstanding
their sexual relationship. The basis for the intentional infliction claim, however, was the
attorney's coercion of her into the sexual affair. The plaintiff asserted that she submitted
to the defendant's sexual advances "out of fear that he would intentionally lose her case if
she spurned him... [and that] she would lose custody of her 5-year-old daughter and be
deported to Spain." Id.
207. See McDaniel v. Gile, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
208. See Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 102-03 (111. App. Ct. 1990), appeal
denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. 1991).
209. See McDaniel, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
210. Id. at 249.
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4. Violation of RICO
The difficulty of establishing civil liability in cases involving attorney-
client sexual relations has led one client to sue her former attorney with
whom she was sexually involved for civil damages under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.2 1 In Doe v. Roe,2" 2 the cli-
ent alleged that the attorney lured her into a sexual affair with him by
preying both upon her emotional vulnerability during her divorce and
upon her financial inability to obtain other counsel once she had paid the
defendant a substantial retainer.21 3 The client sued under RICO, alleg-
ing that the attorney had defrauded her of money, property, and honest
services in violation of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.2 14
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plain-
tiff's complaint. 215 The court held that the plaintiff did not allege an
injury to "business or property" as a result of a RICO violation.216 The
court found that no other court had ever sustained a RICO claim based
solely upon personal or emotional injuries and rejected the plaintiff's at-
tempts to characterize her injuries as relating to her property interests. 2"
The main flaw in the plaintiff's case was the absence of any pecuniary
harm apart from some expenses incidental to her personal injuries. The
plaintiff initially paid the defendant a $7500 retainer, and the defendant
represented to her that any fees above that amount would be paid by the
plaintiff's husband as part of the divorce settlement.2"' Nevertheless, the
defendant presented her with a bill for legal fees in excess of the retainer
amount and, when she could not pay it, accepted sexual services in lieu of
payment.2" 9 In addition, the plaintiff's husband refused to pay any of his
wife's attorney's fees after he discovered his wife and the defendant in
flagrante delicto. ° The attorney failed to pursue a court order requiring
the husband to pay the wife's legal fees for fear that his indiscretion
would be exposed to the court.221
The plaintiff first argued that the defendant fraudulently induced her
to engage in sexual activity with him, resulting in her husband's refusal
to pay her attorney's fees and forcing her to provide additional sexual
211. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1992).
212. 958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992). As in some other civil suits involving charges of
attorney sexual misconduct, the names of both parties were not revealed for the public
record. The court in Doe made it clear, however, that the defendant in that case was the
same lawyer sued in Suppressed v. Suppressed. See id at 769 n.4.
213. See id at 765.
214. See id at 767. Mail and wire fraud violations fall within RICO's definition of a
"racketeering act." See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1992).
215. See Doe, 958 F.2d at 770.
216. See id.
217. See id at 767-68.
218. See id. at 765.
219. See id at 766.
220. See id. at 765.
221. See id.
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labors to the defendant to satisfy his fee.222 Thus deprived of her sexual
labors, which have a monetary worth, the plaintiff claimed to satisfy the
"property" element of RICO.223 The court rejected this argument be-
cause under Illinois law, by which "property" is to be defined for pur-
poses of RICO, sexual labor has no legal value.224
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiff's argument that certain
miscellaneous expenses incurred during her association with the attorney
constituted loss of property.225 These expenses included loss of pay, cost
of a security system, the value of companionship services provided to the
attorney, and the cost of a new lawyer.226 These expenses, while clearly
pecuniary, flowed from her emotional distress and were thus related to
the personal injuries that she suffered.227 No doubt the court was trou-
bled by the plaintiff's attempt to stretch an already-overused statute to fit
what was essentially a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or legal mal-
practice. The court was sympathetic to the plaintiff's desire to deter
Roe's "reprehensible conduct, ' 228 but held that RICO was not the ap-
propriate avenue of relief.
5. Restitution
Clients without redress for their attorneys' sexual misconduct in tort
may be able to recover under a theory of unjust enrichment or restitu-
tion. Unjust enrichment is predicated upon the notion that defendants
who receive unjust gain at plaintiffs' expense should be forced to disgorge
or to give up that gain to the plaintiffs.229 Restitutionary remedies exist
both at law230 and in equity231 and are normally measured by the amount
of the unjust benefit received by defendants rather than by the amount of
plaintiffs' loss.2 3 2 If clients pay their attorneys for services that they later
found were never rendered, they could recoup those amounts by suing in
unjust enrichment or breach of contract and force the return of the
unearned sums.
222. See id. at 768.
223. See id.
224. See id. (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979)).
225. See id. at 770.
226. See id. at 769-70.
227. The court noted that "[m]ost personal injuries-loss of earnings, loss of consor-
tium, loss of guidance, mental anguish, and pain and suffering... will entail some pecuni-
ary consequences. Perhaps the economic aspects of such injuries could, as a theoretical
matter, be viewed as injuries to 'business or property,' but engaging in such metaphysical
speculation is a task best left to philosophers, not the federal judiciary." Id. at 770.
228. Id.
229. See Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760); Restatement of Restitu-
tion § 1 cmt. c (1937); 1 George Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 2.6, at 81 (1978).
230. See, e.g., Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1929) (explaining quasi-
contractual legal remedies for conversion of goods sold and delivered).
231. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Stauffer, 351 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa. 1976) (discussing equitable
remedy of constructive trust).
232. See Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 421 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1969);
Dan Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1(1) (2d ed. 1993).
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A recent Illinois case illustrates the potential for the use of this theory
in the context of attorney-client sexual relations. In In re Marriage of
Kantar,33 the Illinois appellate court allowed a divorce client to petition
the court to recalculate the attorney's fees in her case where the client
alleged, among other things, that the attorney had billed her for time
during which they had sexual relations.23 Earlier the client had agreed
to the attorney's statement of fees at a "prove up" hearing in conjunction
with the dissolution proceeding.235 Later the client filed a petition for
relief from the judgment for attorney's fees" 6 based, in part, on her in-
ability at the time of the "prove up" to evaluate objectively the fee state-
ment presented by the attorney.237
The court held that the trial court erred in granting the respondent
attorney's motion for summary judgment."8 The client had alleged suffi-
cient facts in her petition to warrant a reexamination of the statement of
attorney's fees and had filed the petition with due diligence. 23 9 The court
declined to address whether the alleged sexual relationship between the
parties breached the attorney's fiduciary duty because the allegation of
fee impropriety was sufficient by itself to support the petition.21°
In his concurring opinion Justice Greiman stated that the attorney's
alleged sexual misconduct was relevant to the appropriateness of award-
ing attorney's fees.241 The concurrence described sexual misconduct by
attorneys as the "legal profession's 'dirty little secret,' "242 and suggested
that, at a minimum, lawyers who initiate sexual relationships with their
clients, particularly in matrimonial cases, have created a conflict of inter-
est.243 Although the concurring justice did not believe that an ethical
rule specifically banning attorney-client sexual relations was absolutely
necessary, he did advocate a per se rule of law requiring attorneys to
forfeit their fees in matrimonial cases for services rendered after com-
mencing a sexual relationship with their client.2 "
233. 581 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1016 (In. 1992).
234. See id
235. See icL at 7-8. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act allows the
attorney to recover fees from his client in the main action for divorce as opposed to suing
the client separately. See Ill. Comp. Laws Ann. ch. 750, § 5/508 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
236. In Illinois a party may petition the court for relief from a final judgment within
two years of the entry of that judgment. See Ill. Comp. Laws Ann. ch. 735, § 5/2-1401
(Smith-Hurd 1993).
237. The client alleged that her attorney pressured her into agreeing to the fee state-
ment at the "prove up" hearing by telling her that she could not get divorced unless she
agreed to pay the fee. See In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6 (I11. App. Ct. 1991),
appeal denied, 587 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 1992). She also alleged that he threatened to with-
draw from the case unless she assented to her husband's demands. See id. at 9.
238. See id. at 11.
239. See id at 10-11.
240. See id at 11.
241. See id. at 12 (Greiman, J., specially concurring).
242. See id
243. See id. at 12-13.
244. See id at 15-16. Justice Greiman did not express an opinion as to the propriety of
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In some cases attorneys' fees are not subject to court supervision as in
Kantar. In the unusual case where attorneys actually bill clients for time
spent in sexual activities, the client should be able to recover the amounts
paid through theories of unjust enrichment, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, or fraud. Even where attorneys lack the audacity to bill
for sex, clients might be able to pursue unjust enrichment claims if their
involvement caused them to overpay for legal services. In other words,
unscrupulous lawyers might overcharge their lover-clients for legal serv-
ices by padding the hours expended or by inflating the hourly rate and,
because of their emotional attachment, the clients might not realize that
the charges were excessive.24 5
C. Judicial Sanctions
In cases where the courts have supervisory power over the award of
attorneys' fees, clients may be able to challenge the amounts charged by
attorneys without having to sue separately to recover for fees overpaid.246
Additionally, at least one case, Edwards v. Edwards,247 suggests that at-
torneys may be sanctioned for continuing to represent clients in divorce
actions after the clients' spouses have raised the attorneys' sexual in-
volvement.248 In Edwards, the lower court imposed monetary sanctions
and costs on an attorney who refused to withdraw voluntarily from rep-
resenting a client in a divorce matter after the client's husband accused
the attorney in open court of being sexually involved with the client.
249
The lower court accepted the husband's assertion that the attorney had
engaged in "frivolous" conduct by continuing to represent his client
under those circumstances.250
The New York appellate court's reversal of the imposition of sanctions
illustrates the need for more definite rules on the propriety of attorney-
client sexual relations. The appellate court stated that sanctions for the
attorney's refusal to withdraw were not justified unless withdrawal was
"clearly and unequivocally mandated by existing law."' 25 1 Given that
there was no explicit prohibition on attorney-client sexual relations in the
sexual relations between clients and attorneys in non-matrimonial cases nor did he "de-
termine whether the lawyer is entitled to fees accrued or received prior to their sexual
relationship." Id. at 15 n.9.
245. Perhaps more commonly, attorneys eliminate or cut their fees either because of
quid pro quo arrangements or because of the their own emotional attachment to their
clients. Some practitioners may not consider romantic entanglements with their clients
because it might reduce their chances of being able to collect legal fees.
246. See supra notes 233-44 and accompanying text.
247. 567 N.Y.S.2d 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
248. See id. at 646.
249. See id.
250. See id. New York court rules define conduct as frivolous if "it is completely
without merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law .... N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 22, § 130-1.1(c)(1) (1993).
251. Id.
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New York ethics rules at the time, the attorney was not required to with-
draw absent a violation of some existing ethical rule. 2 After the hus-
band formally accused his wife of adultery, however, the attorney
became a potential witness as to the adultery and was required to termi-
nate his representation under DR 5-102(B), which he did within three
days.253 New York has recently changed its rules to prohibit matrimo-
nial lawyers from engaging in sexual relations with their clients, effective
in November 1993.254
Although the court reversed the imposition of sanctions in this case, it
clearly indicated that attorneys who continued to represent their clients
under circumstances in which an ethical transgression was present or im-
minent could be sanctioned. The court, however, discouraged the use of
sanctions in the absence of a clear-cut violation of the rules of profes-
sional conduct. Once again, the absence of an explicit rule on the propri-
ety of attorney-client sexual relationships decreases the deterrent effect of
this remedy.
III. CURRENT EFFORTS AT REFORM
With the increase in public outrage over sexual improprieties by law-
yers and other professionals have come proposals for new regulations.
Advocates of additional regulation observe that neither existing bar rules
nor theories of civil liability have provided adequate deterrence of attor-
ney sexual misconduct nor satisfactory redress for those clients injured
by sexual involvement with their lawyers. In enforcing current bar rules,
disciplinary bodies arguably have been hamstrung by the need to find a
nexus between the sexual activity and the attorneys' representation of
their clients or their general fitness to practice law-a connection often
difficult to establish. In the same vein, plaintiffs suing their former law-
yers for malpractice have often failed to satisfy the requirement that the
sexual misconduct affected the quality of the legal representation.
In response to the demands for reform, two states, California and Ore-
gon, have enacted new bar rules restricting sexual relations between at-
torneys and their clients.2 5 In New York the Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals recently issued a comprehensive set of rules controlling abu-
sive practices by the matrimonial bar, including a rule barring sexual
relations between matrimonial lawyers and their clients." 6 New York is
currently studying whether to extend these new rules to all practitioners
252. See il at 649.
253. See id.
254. See Jan Hoffman, New York's Chief Judge Imposes Strict Rules for Divorce Law.
yers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1993, at Al.
255. See Court Adopts Sex Rules for Calif Lawyers, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 31, 1992, at 6;
Peter Lewis, Lawyers Consider Rule Banning Sex with Clients, Seattle Times, May 20,
1993, at B1; Oregon Attorneys Ban Sex With Clients, Wash. Times, Sept. 28, 1992, at A2.
256. See Hoffman, supra note 254, at Al.
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within the state.257 Other states are also considering proposals for
amendments to their ethics rules.258
Most states, however, are taking no action at the present time and
presumably are content to rely on enforcement of existing bar rules to
curb attorney sexual misconduct. 259  This Part discusses several ap-
proaches to regulating attorney-client sexual relations, including those
adopted in California and Oregon. Part IV advocates a ban on sexual
relationships between attorneys and their individual clients, except where
the parties had a preexisting relationship.
A. Opposition to a New Rule
Some commentators have argued that no specific new rule on attorney-
client sexual relations is needed and, in fact, would be detrimental.
260
They point out that the present bar rules governing conflicts of interest,
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, and competence adequately
regulate attorney sexual misconduct.26 For example, as discussed ear-
262etialier, current ethical rules restrict an attorney's ability to accept or con-
tinue employment if a personal interest would impair the exercise of
professional judgment.263 This rule would seem to restrain attorneys in
some circumstances from representing present as well as would-be lovers
in legal matters. Arguably, attorneys who have sexual relationships with
their clients may not be able to use their best objective judgment in repre-
sentation. Attorneys who represent their clients under those circum-
stances face possible discipline under current bar rules unless they can
257. See Stephen Labaton, New Rules for the Bar: Are Divorce Lawyers Really the Slea-
ziest?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1993, at E5.
258. See Lewis, supra note 255, at B1.
259. See id.
260. See Sexual Relations with Client: Problem With No Clear Answer, 8 Laws. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 10, at 171-73 (June 17, 1992); Stephen G. Hirsch,
Bar Panel Again Rejects Flat Ban on Client Sex, The Recorder, Apr. 12, 1991, at 2;
Saundra Torry, Proposals to Regulate Sex with Clients Spark Wrenching Debate, Wash.
Post, Sept. 7, 1992, at F5.
An informal telephone poll of state bar associations during late February and early
March 1993 revealed that most states presently are not considering any specific new ethi-
cal rule regarding attorney-client sexual relations. California and Oregon are the only
two states with rules specifically on this issue. See infra part III.B-C. Arizona, Florida,
and Illinois are considering proposed rules on attorney sexual misconduct. See Tele-
phone Interviews with Sharon Frye, Ariz. State Bar Ass'n (Feb. 26, 1993); Rosalyn Scott,
Fla. State Bar Ass'n (Mar. 2, 1993); Wendy Muchman, Ill. Attorney Registration & Dis-
ciplinary Comm'n (Mar. 4, 1993). Hawaii and Washington State are in the process of
enacting rules prohibiting sexual discrimination or harassment by lawyers in a broader
context. See Telephone Interviews with Dew Kaneshiro, Haw. Comm. of Bar Ass'n &
Judiciary (Mar. 1, 1993); Bob Welden, Wash. State Bar Ass'n (Feb 26, 1993).
261. See Philip Corboy, Attorney Discipline: Do We Need an Ethical Rule Restricting
Sexual Relations with Clients? No: It's Already Covered, 78 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 34-
35.
262. See supra part II.A.2.
263. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-101(A); Model Rules, supra note 73, Rule
1.7.
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show their clients' awareness of the possible loss of objectivity and know-
ing waiver of any conflict of interest.264
Opponents of a specific new rule contend that more vigorous enforce-
ment of existing rules would increase the bar's awareness of the problem
and would be sufficient to provide sanctions in cases of true abuse.265 A
ban on sexual relations, these commentators argue, would be overbroad
and would intrude unnecessarily on the privacy of the parties.266 Clients,
who, although willingly consenting to the sexual affair, later become dis-
enchanted with the relationship may misuse such a rule and may retaliate
by bringing a disciplinary complaint.267 Finally, proponents of the status
quo assert that the problem of attorney-client sexual relations, although
the subject of some media attention from time to time, is relatively mi-
nor. The state bar associations with pertinent statistics report very few
complaints from clients about attorney sexual misconduct.268 Thus it is
264. See id.
265. See Corboy, supra note 261, at 34-35.
266. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Calif Restricts Attorney-Client Sex, 78 A.B.A. J., July
1991, at 26-27; Joanne Pitulla, Unfair Advantage, 78 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 76; Char-
lotte Allen, Who Should Judge the Prudence of Lawyers Having Sex with Clients?, Wash.
Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at E4.
A New Hampshire Bar Association committee encountered opposition to a specific ban
on attorney-client sexual relations based on privacy concerns:
Clearly, a lawyer has a right to privacy in relationships entered into "as a per-
son"; equally clearly, there is no right to privacy in the application of the [Eth-
ics] Rules to relationships entered into "as a lawyer," meaning by use of the
power and influence a lawyer enjoys by license of the state. Not all relation-
ships will fall neatly into one or the other category.
New Hampshire Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee, Ethical Sex? in Practical Ethics 15 (Feb.
10, 1993).
267. The court in Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ap-
peal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. 1991), noted the dangers of blackmail by unscrupulous
persons if the court were to recognize a cause of action for lawyer malpractice based on
sexual affairs with their clients that injured only the clients' emotional well-being and did
not interfere with the legal services. See &l. at 106 n.3. The court stated that "we would
be opening the door to any number of malpractice actions brought by clients who may
have been less than satisfied with their legal representation but can point to no specific
harm other than their own emotional distress. The potential for abuse would be too
great." Id at 106 (footnote omitted). Similarly, if a bar rule prohibited attorney-client
sexual relationships, clients dissatisfied with their attorneys because of the breakup of
their personal relationship might threaten to file a complaint with the bar association as a
means of coercing resumption of the relationship or cash payments. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the likelihood of blackmail is any greater with this particular ethical rule as
opposed to other bar rules.
268. Two lawyers informally polled the fifty state bar associations and found that
among the thirty-two states that responded with statistics no more than one percent of
the complaints received over a recent two-year period involved attorney-client sexual
contact. See Linda Mabus Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Lawyer-Client Sexual
Contact: State Bars Polled, Nat'l L.J., June 15, 1992, at 26. The Illinois Attorney Regis-
tration and Disciplinary Commission reported that about one percent of the 5,000 com-
plaints that it received in 1989 concerned attorney-client sexual encounters. See Illinois
Gender Bias Task Force, Ill. Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts 54 (1990).
On the other hand, in a survey of randomly selected attorneys by Memphis State Uni-
versity professors, 31% of the respondents said that they knew of one or more instances
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not necessary for the bar to add a specific new regulation on sexual rela-
tions to the already extensive ethical codes. An overly detailed ethical
code with a myriad of rules addressing infrequent situations, it is argued,
detracts from the code's purpose of setting relatively broad standards of
conduct.269
B. The California Rule
In 1989 the California state legislature ordered the California Bar As-
sociation ("CBA") to adopt a specific rule regulating attorney-client sex-
ual relations.27 ° In the fall of 1991, the CBA recommended to the
California Supreme Court adoption of a rule restricting attorney-client
sexual relations.271 The court initially declined to adopt the proposed
rule pending further opportunity for public comment. 2  After almost a
year, the California Supreme Court adopted the proposed rule in August
1992 with one significant modification.273 Shortly thereafter, reacting to
the perceived weakness of the rule, the California State Assembly exer-
cised its concurrent jurisdiction over the legal profession and enacted a
supposedly tougher restriction on attorney-client sexual relations. 2 74 The
of lawyer-client sexual relationships. See J.L. Bernard et al., Dangerous Liaisons, 78
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 82. Six percent of the respondents, moreover, admitted to hav-
ing had sexual affairs with one or more clients-a percentage that the survey authors
suggested "may well understate the problem." Id.
269. See Corboy, supra note 261, at 34-35; Pitulla, supra note 266, at 76-79.
270. See Cal. Bar Act, supra note 3, § 6106.8. California State Senator Lucille Roybal-
Allard initiated the legislation because of her concern over accusations of rape against
California "palimony" lawyer Marvin Mitchelson. See DeBenedictis, supra note 266, at
26. The statute directed the California State Bar, with the approval of the Supreme
Court, to adopt a rule "governing sexual relations between attorneys and their clients in
cases involving, but not limited to, probate matters and domestic relations, including
dissolution proceedings, child custody cases, and settlement proceedings." Cal. Bar Act,
supra note 3, § 6106.8(b).
271. See Michele Fuetsch, Bar OKs Limits on Lawyer, Client Sex, L.A. Times, Apr.
21, 1991, at A3.
272. See Philip Hager, Lawyer-Client Sex Ethics Rule Blocked by Court, L.A. Times,
Aug. 28, 1991, at A3.
273. See Cal. Sup. Ct., Request for Approval of Rule of Professional Conduct 3-120,
No. S024408 (Aug. 13, 1992). The California Supreme Court adopted only subsections
(A) through (D) of the California Bar Association proposal and rejected subsection (E),
which created the presumption that an attorney who has had sexual relations with a
client represents the client incompetently in violation of California bar rule 3-110. See id.
274. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6106.9 (West Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Cal. Code].
The full text of the California statute is as follows:
(a) It shall constitute cause for the imposition of discipline of an attorney
within the meaning of this chapter for an attorney to do any of the following:
(1) Expressly or impliedly condition the performance of legal services for
a current or prospective client upon the client's willingness to engage in
sexual relations with the attorney.
(2) Employ coercion, intimidation, or undue influence in entering into
sexual relations with a client.
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom the attorney has sex-
ual relations if the sexual relations cause the attorney to perform legal serv-
ices incompetently in violation of Rule 3-110 of the Rules of Professional
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California Supreme Court rule and the California statute are almost iden-
tical in a number of respects. Both carve out three circumstances under
which sex between attorneys and clients is prohibited: (1) quid pro quo
arrangements; (2) use of coercion or intimidation; and (3) effects on at-
torney competence. 275
Under the supreme court rule, attorneys may not demand sex from
their clients "incident to or as a condition of any professional representa-
tion. '2 76  The California statute expands this provision slightly by
prohibiting attorneys from "[e]xpressly or impliedly condition[ing] the
performance of legal services for a current or prospective client upon the
client's willingness to engage in sexual relations with the attorney."'Z
The statute applies to situations where the request for a quid pro quo
Conduct of the State Bar of California, or if the sexual relations would, or
would be likely to, damage or prejudice the client's case.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to sexual relations between attorneys and
their spouses or persons in an equivalent domestic relationship or to ongoing
consensual sexual relationships that predate the initiation of the attorney-client
relationship.
(c) Where an attorney in a firm has sexual relations with a client but does not
participate in the representation of that client, the attorneys in the firm shall not
be subject to discipline under this section solely because of the occurrence of
those sexual relations.
(d) For the purposes of this section, "sexual relations" means sexual inter-
course or the touching of an intimate part of another person for the purpose of
sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(e) Any complaint made to the State Bar alleging a violation of subsection (a)
shall be verified under oath by the person making the complaint.
Id.
275. The full text of the adopted version of California Rule 3-120 is as follows:
(A) For purposes of this rule, "sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or
the touching of an intimate part of another person for the purpose of sexual
arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(B) A member shall not:
(1) Require or demand sexual relations with a client incident to or as a
condition of any professional representation; or
(2) Employ coercion, intimidation, or undue influence in entering into
sexual relations with a client; or
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom the member has sexual
relations if such sexual relations cause the member to perform legal serv-
ices incompetently in violation of rule 3-110.
(C) Paragraph (B) shall not apply to sexual relations between members and
their spouses or to ongoing consensual sexual relationships which predate the
initiation of the lawyer-client relationship.
(D) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a client but does not
participate in the representation of that client, the lawyers in the firm shall not
be subject to discipline under this rule solely because of the occurrence of such
sexual relations.
Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-120 (1992) [hereinafter Cal. Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct]. Rule 3-110 provides that "[a] member shall not intentionally, or with
reckless disregard, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services competently." Id. at Rule
3-110(A).
276. Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Rule 3-120(B)(1).
277. Cal. Code, supra note 274, § 6106.9(a)(1).
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arrangement is implicit rather than express.27 In other words, the law-
yer does not openly ask the client to pay for legal services with sexual
favors, but instead suggests, through innuendo, that the vigor and effi-
ciency of the representation may depend on whether the client agrees to
an affair. The statute, unlike the rule, also reaches attorneys' behavior
toward prospective as well as current clients and thus prevents lawyers
from arguing that the party from whom sexual favors were demanded
was merely seeking representation and was not yet a client.279
Both the bar rule and the statute also prohibit attorneys from using
"coercion, intimidation, or undue influence in entering into sexual rela-
tions with a client."'2 ° This prohibition overlaps somewhat with the pre-
vious section in that attorneys who offer clients the option of granting
sexual favors in lieu of paying cash may be coercing impecunious clients.
Clients without the resources to pay their attorneys' bill in full, but who
are able to discharge it in installments, may feel pressured to accede to
the lawyers' demands. Even without an explicit quid pro quo arrange-
ment, clients may be desperate, vulnerable, or anxious about an impend-
ing legal matter, and fearful that their attorneys will not provide vigorous
representation unless they agree to sexual relations. If clients have just
spent their last few dollars on a retainer, they may be reluctant to dis-
charge their lawyer and seek counsel elsewhere.28'
The California bar rule's third provision has the broadest reach,
prohibiting continued representation of clients with whom attorneys
have engaged in a sexual relationship if the relationship "cause[s] the
[attorneys] to perform legal services incompetently .... 282 Unlike the
final rule adopted, the original CBA proposal created the presumption of
incompetence on the part of attorneys who have engaged in sexual rela-
tions with their clients.28 3 Under the proposed rule accused attorneys
would have had to rebut that presumption by proving competent repre-
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Rule 3-120(B)(2); Cal. Code,
supra note 274, § 6106.9(a)(2).
281. In one suit against an attorney, the client pleaded:
[a]Ithough [she] felt repulsed by [the attorney's] sexual advances, she submitted
because of her fear that otherwise he would not represent her and that since she
could not afford a retainer fee to hire a third counsel in her divorce case, she
might go unrepresented and lose both custody of her child and the opportunity
for financial security for herself and her child.
Doe v. Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992).
282. Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Rule 3-120(B)(3).
283. Proposed California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-120 contained a subsection
(E):
A member who engages in sexual relations with his or her client will be pre-
sumed to violate rule 3-120, paragraph (B)(3). This presumption shall only be
used as a presumption affecting the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings
involving alleged violations of these rules. "Presumption affecting the burden of
proof" means that presumption defined in Evidence Code sections 605 and 606.
Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Proposed Rule 3-120.
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sentation despite the sexual relationship.2 Without comment the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court dropped the presumption of incompetence.2"5
Thus the prosecutor in a disciplinary proceeding presumably bears the
burden of proving inadequate representation caused by the sexual
affair. 286
The third section of the California statute, while identical in its incom-
petence standard, expands the bar rule by prohibiting attorneys from rep-
resenting clients with whom they have had sexual relations if "the sexual
relations would, or would be likely to, damage or prejudice the client's
case."' 2 87 For example, lawyers who commence affairs with clients they
represent in divorce actions may continue to represent their clients com-
petently but, nevertheless, may injure the case by exposing their clients to
allegations of adultery from the clients' spouse. Curiously, although the
state legislature passed the statute supposedly to strengthen the prohibi-
tions in the bar rule, it is only slightly more restrictive and does not con-
tain the presumption of incompetence of the original proposed bar rule.
The first two provisions of the California rule and of the statute at-
tempt to curtail the most egregious abuses by attorneys who prey upon
clients by taking advantage of their own superior position and of their
clients' extreme vulnerability. The third sections of both the rule and the
statute embrace the notion that, in some cases, a fully consensual sexual
relationship causes no detriment to clients. The California Supreme
Court eliminated the presumption of incompetence in the original propo-
sal, perhaps believing that an attorney-client affair does not inevitably
interfere with attorneys' representation of their clients.288 The rule im-
plicitly acknowledges that such a relationship may affect the lawyers'
competence through the loss of objectivity or the creation of a conflict of
interest, but places the burden on the prosecutor to show that the affair
adversely affected the clients' interests. 28 9 Attorneys must then demon-
strate competent and responsible representation within the ordinary stan-
dards of the profession, notwithstanding the personal involvement. 29°
284. See Hager, supra note 272, at A3.
285. See Court Adopts Sex Rules for Calif Lawyers, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at 6, col.
1.
286. See id
287. Cal. Code, supra note 274, § 6106.9(a)(3).
288. One observer has suggested, tongue-in-cheek, that in some instances sexual af-
fairs with their clients may improve some attorneys' competence because an active and
satisfying social life will increase the lawyers' sense of well-being and, consequently, effec-
tiveness at work. See Leslie M. Hartman, Sex With Client Could Improve Competence,
The Recorder, Apr. 29, 1991, at 4. Similarly, one could speculate that attorneys who are
sexually involved with their clients might provide more vigorous representation because
of their personal attachment.
289. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Rule 3-120(B)C3); Court
Adopts Sex Rules for Calif. Lawyers, Natl L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at 6, col. 1.
290. See Cal. Rules of Professional Responsibility, supra note 275, Rule 3-120(B)(3).
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C. The Oregon Rule
Proponents of a per se rule banning sexual relations between attorneys
and their clients argue that an across-the-board prohibition is the only
truly effective way to eliminate the perceived abuses of such relation-
ships.29 ' Intimate relationships with clients, no matter how carefully
conducted, carry a high probability of injury to the clients and their in-
terests, thereby justifying a ban. In addition, a per se rule eliminates the
exercise of the attorneys' judgment as to when sexual relationships with
their clients would be injurious.
In December 1992 the Oregon Supreme Court promulgated an amend-
ment to the state code of professional responsibility creating an across-
the-board prohibition on attorney-client sexual relations. 292 The court
291. The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers recently promulgated a set of
aspirational standards for its members, which includes a per se rule banning attorney-
client sexual relations. This standard states that "[alan attorney should never have a sex-
ual relationship with a client or opposing counsel during the time of the representation."
Gerald L. Nissenbaum, Chicago Sex Rule Doesn't Go Far Enough, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 13,
1992, at 14 (quoting American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Bounds of Advocacy
Standard 2.16 (1991) (emphasis added)). The Academy, one can assume, opted for an
across-the-board ban because of its awareness that the matrimonial bar is a prime source
of client complaints about sexual misconduct. See id.
The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, drafted as a alternative to the ABA's Model
Rules, also prohibits the commencement of sexual relations with a client during the pe-
riod of the lawyer-client relationship. See Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foun-
dation, Comm'n on Professional Responsibility, The American Lawyer's Code of
Conduct Rule 8.8 (Revised Draft 1982). According to the Comments, the rule "recog-
nizes the dependency of a client upon a lawyer, the high degree of trust that a client is
entitled to place in a lawyer, and the potential for unfair advantage in such a relation-
ship." Id. at Rule 8.8 cmt.
In addition to Oregon, whose new rule is discussed infra, Florida and Washington are
also considering new ethical rules that would prohibit all lawyer-client sexual relations
during the time of representation unless the parties had a preexisting sexual relationship.
See Florida Proposed Rule on Attorney-Client Sexual Relationships, in Fla. State Bar's
Special Comm. for Gender Equality in the Profession (Feb. 16, 1993) (available from
Tony Boggs, Florida State Bar Ass'n); Lewis, supra note 255, at Bl.
In addition, the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association recently
approved an amendment to its code of its professional responsibility that would forbid
lawyers from "[c]ommit[ting] a discriminatory act prohibited by law or harass[ing] a
person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability,
sexual orientation, or marital status, where the act of discrimination or harassment is
committed in connection with the lawyer's professional activities." Wash. Proposed Rule
of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) (1993). Conceivably, such an anti-harassment provision
could be used to discipline lawyers who made unwelcome sexual advances or sexual com-
ments to prospective or current clients. Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have also adopted or proposed
similar anti-bias rules within the last five years. See Don J. DeBenedictis, More States
Ban Bias by Lawyers, 79 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 24-25; Rosalind Resnick, Florida Joins
Other States Barring Lawyers' Acts of Bias, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1992, at 3.
292. Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-110, promulgated on Decem-
ber 31, 1992, reads as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current client of the law-
yer unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them before the law-
yer/client relationship commenced.
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accepted, without change, the proposed rule passed by the Oregon State
Bar in the fall of 1992.293 This rule bars attorneys from having sexual
relationships with current clients unless the parties had a consensual sex-
ual relationship before the period of representation.294 The exception al-
lows lawyers to represent their spouses and other pre-existing lovers.
The new rule also bans sexual relations between lawyers and represent-
atives of current clients "if the sexual relations would, or would likely,
damage or prejudice the client in the representation. ' 295 The Oregon
rule takes the position that sexual relations between attorneys and repre-
sentatives of corporations, associations, or other entities are not necessar-
ily harmful but should be barred if they would injure the clients' legal
representation.296 In most cases, however, existing disciplinary rules ad-
(B) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a representative of a current
client of the lawyer if the sexual relations would, or would likely, damage or
prejudice the client in the representation.
(C) For purposes of DR 5-110 "sexual relations" means:
(1) Sexual intercourse; or
(2) Any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or
causing such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the law-
yer for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either
party.
(D) For purposes of DR 5-110 "lawyer" means any lawyer who assists in the
representation of the client, but does not include other firm members who pro-
vide no such assistance.
Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-110 (1992) [hereinafter Or. Code of
Professional Responsibility].
293. See Oregon State Bar, Resolution No. 7 (1992). In 1991, the Oregon state bar
voted by a narrow margin not to adopt a similar rule that would have restricted attorney-
client sexual relations. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Sex-with-Client Ban Fails, 78 A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1992, at 24. The proposed rule provided:
(A) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current client or represen-
tative of a current client.
(B) This rule shall not apply where the sexual relations are between spouses or
began prior to the establishment of the lawyer-client relationship and where the
lawyer's professional judgment is not or reasonably will not be affected by the
sexual relationship.
(C) For purposes of this rule "sexual relations" means:
(1) sexual intercourse; or
(2) any touching of the sexual or intimate parts of a person or causing
such person to touch the sexual or intimate parts of the actor for the pur-
pose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.
Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility Proposed Rule 5-110 (1991).
294. See Or. Code of Professional Responsibility, supra note 292, DR 5-1 10(A).
295. Ia DR 5-110(B).
296. It may be difficult to see how a sexual relationship between its representative and
its attorneys would prejudice an entity client, other than by a possible conflict of interest.
For example, suppose a corporation hired an attorney to represent it in its efforts to
acquire a piece of real property. During the period of representation the attorney and the
corporation's president begin an affair. The president may express a desire to acquire the
property for personal gain and may suggest that the attorney falsely tell the board of
directors that the property cannot be acquired on the terms offered by the corporation.
An attorney who, inspired by passion or greed, follows the president's suggestion would
have acted to the client's detriment in violation of the rules regarding conflicts of interest
and prejudice to the client's interests. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 5-101(A)
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equately reach lawyers' sexual involvement with their clients' representa-
tives when it injures their clients' legal interests.2 9 7 Perhaps the Oregon
Supreme Court, by adding the provision on sexual relations with client
representatives, wanted to emphasize the need for caution and increased
awareness of possible conflicts of interest in those situations.
A ban on attorney-client sexual relations, similar to that adopted in
Oregon, would regulate most effectively attorney misconduct in this
area.29  Such a rule would demonstrate to the public and to practicing
attorneys the bar's serious attitude toward the issue and would provide
clear and unequivocal standards for lawyers to follow. Unlike the other
proposals discussed, aper se rule leaves little room for lawyers' subjective
judgment as to when sexual relationships are harmful, but allows the
parties the freedom to choose their sexual partners by terminating their
professional association.
D. The Illinois Proposal
In 1991 the Illinois Senate, following California's lead, passed a resolu-
tion urging the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt an ethical rule governing
attorney-client sexual relations.299 In January 1992 the Chicago Bar As-
sociation's Board of Managers unanimously approved a proposed rule
developed by a Chicago Bar Association subcommittee and recom-
mended its adoption by the Illinois Supreme Court. 3 °
The proposed Illinois rule focuses mostly on undue influence. The rule
prohibits sexual relations between attorneys and clients where (1) the at-
torney exercises duress, intimidation, or undue influence to induce the
sexual relationship or (2) the attorney "knows or reasonably should
know that the client's ability to decide whether to engage in sexual rela-
tions is impaired by the client's emotional or financial dependency, or
some other reason. ' 30 1 The first part of the proposed rule is directed at
(regarding conflicts of interest), DR 7-101(A)(3) (regarding prejudice to client); see also
supra part II.A.2-3.
297. See Model Code, supra note 16, DR 7-I01(A)(3).
298. See infra part IV.
299. See S. Res. 361, 87th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 5 Ill. Sen. J. 5473 (1991). The resolution
"urge[d] the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt a rule of professional conduct prohibiting
attorney-client sexual relationships during the period of the attorney-client relationship,
unless the client is the spouse of the attorney, the sexual relationship predates the com-
mencement of the attorney-client relationship, or some other situation exists in which the
court deems the prohibition would not detract from the attorney's representation of the
client ....." Id. The resolution's wording is much stronger than the ultimate proposed
rule submitted by the Chicago Bar Association to the Illinois Supreme Court. See infra
note 301.
300. See Chicago Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Report of the Sub-
committee on Attorney-Client Sexual Misconduct (1991). Although the Illinois Supreme
Court has taken no action on this proposed rule in the last two years, recent sexual mis-
conduct charges against two prominent Chicago lawyers have prompted renewed de-
mand for action on the rule. See John Flynn Rooney, Proponents Renew Call for Court
Rule Against Lawyer-Client Sex, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Sept. 17, 1993, at 1.
301. Illinois Proposed Rule of Professional Conduct 1.17 reads in full:
[Vol. 62
A TTORNEY-CLIENT SEXUAL RELATIONS
intentional overreaching by lawyers; the second part at the nonmalicious,
but nonetheless knowing, persuasion of vulnerable clients to engage in a
sexual relationships.
Like the California regulations, the first part of this rule clearly ac-
knowledges that it is unethical for lawyers to use their superior position
to coerce clients into sexual affairs. Lawyers should not threaten to with-
hold legal representation or to turn the client's bill over to collection
agencies as a means of inducing the client to provide sexual favors. Such
conduct violates the trust that clients place in their attorneys and inevita-
bly brings the profession as a whole into disrepute.3" 2
The second part of the rule addresses the situation in which attorneys
may be attracted to their clients and may wish to have a consensual sex-
ual relationship, but the clients, nevertheless, may not perceive matters in
the same light. However "honorable" attorneys' intentions may be, cli-
ents may feel unable to refuse advances, despite their wish to do so, for
fear of retaliation in the form of inadequate representation. Clients also
may have experienced a form of "transference," a phenomenon well
known to the psychiatric profession, which may inhibit them from re-
jecting the attorneys' advances.303 The transference phenomenon,
though most commonly associated with psychiatry, may occur wherever
individuals develop close, trusting relationships with persons in positions
(a) A lawyer shall not, during the representation of a client, engage in sexual
relations with the client if:
(1) The sexual relations are the result of duress, intimidation, or undue
influence by the lawyer, or
(2) The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client's ability
to decide whether to engage in sexual relations is impaired by the client's
emotional or financial dependency, or some other reason.
(b) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a client, the other lawyers
in the firm shall not be subject to discipline solely because of the occurrence of
such sexual relations.
Illinois Code of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 1.17 (1992) [hereinafter Ill. Pro-
posed Rule of Professional Conduct].
302. In its recently issued ethics opinion on lawyer-client sexual relationships, the
ABA emphasized the fiduciary relationship that lawyers have with their client and noted
that "[a] sexual relationship between lawyer and client may involve unfair exploitation of
the lawyer's fiduciary position...." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992). The opinion warned that if "the lawyer permits the
otherwise benign and even recommended client reliance and trust to become the catalyst
for a sexual relationship with a client, the lawyer may violate one of the most basic ethical
obligations, i.e., not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage." Id. at n. 12.
The opinion, while pointing out the possible pitfalls of lawyer-client sexual relationships,
did not suggest that the Model Code or the Model Rules prohibit such relationships in all
circumstances. See id at n.13.
303. See Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis 65-70 (1949); C.G. Jung,
Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice 151-89 (1968). Transference involves
the transferring of emotions that an individual had toward other significant people in his
or her life such as a parent, onto a trusted figure, usually a psychiatrist or other therapist.
In other words, if a female client identifies her therapist with her father with whom she
had an extremely submissive attitude, then she may be unable to refuse any request by the
therapist. See Freud, supra, at 65-70; Jung, supra, at 151-89.
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
of authority, such as lawyers.3 4
Although the Illinois rule attempts to address the situations in which
attorney-client sexual relations are most detrimental to the clients' inter-
ests, the rule may be both underinclusive and overinclusive. Abusive
lawyers may escape punishment and, at the same time, basically ethical
lawyers may face discipline. In a disciplinary proceeding the prosecutor
normally bears the burden of proving an ethical violation by "clear and
convincing evidence."30 It may be difficult, if not impossible, in many
cases to show that accused attorneys knew or should have known of their
clients' emotional or financial dependency, particularly if the clients are
not financially dependent and have sufficient means to choose another
attorney. Unless their clients are without friends or family, absent some
other objective indications of a strong emotional tie, attorneys could eas-
ily argue total unawareness of the clients' vulnerability and psychological
inability to refuse sexual advances.
The "should have known" standard, of course, can be interpreted
quite broadly. For example, individuals going through a contested di-
vorce and fighting for child custody may be said to be so emotionally
vulnerable that they would be unable to rebuff their attorneys' advances.
Because, however, human beings vary greatly in their response to a given
situation, it is difficult to classify all people similarly situated as equally
emotionally susceptible. Indeed, clients in that situation may initiate or
welcome affairs with their attorneys to reaffirm their desirability or to
expand their social horizons. 30 6
304. Professor Jung, the eminent psychoanalyst, has described the involuntary nature
of transference:
Transferene ... is a projection which happens between two individuals and
which, as a rule, is of an emotional and compulsory nature. Emotions in them-
selves are always in some degree overwhelming for the subject, because they are
involuntary conditions which override the intentions of the ego. Moreover,
they cling to the subject, and he cannot detach them from himself. Yet this
involuntary condition of the subject is at the same time projected into the ob-
ject, and through that a bond is established which cannot be broken, and exer-
cises a compulsory influence upon the subject.
Jung, supra note 303, at 154. Transferences can occur in any relationship between two
human beings, but the potential for abuse of the transference is especially great where the
object of the transference is a person with authority or is in a position of special trust. See
Rutter, supra note 5, at 50.
305. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 109 (1986). Although some jurisdic-
tions employ the "preponderance of the evidence" standard or the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, most commonly the burden of proof in lawyer disciplinary proceedings
is "clear and convincing evidence." See id.; see also Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198, 1200
(N.H. 1990) (applying standard of clear and convincing evidence); In re Liebowitz, 516
A.2d 246, 249 (N.J. 1985) (same).
306. It should be pointed out that a ban on sexual relations may offer protection to
attorneys as well as clients. In any given situation a lawyer may find sexual advances
from a client unwelcome and may feel reluctant to rebuff those advances if the client's
business is especially valuable to the lawyer. An ethical rule prohibiting sexual relation-
ships could provide the lawyer with a persuasive reason why the parties should not have
an affair. See Mark Hansen, 9th Circuit Studies Gender Bias, 78 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at
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The proposed Illinois rule concedes that some attorney-client sexual
relationships are ethically acceptable.3 7 Obviously, such relationships
are to be expected between spouses, though one might question the wis-
dom of lawyers who represent their spouses in seriously contested mat-
ters. The rule also seems to allow new relationships to form during the
period of representation; it recognizes the possibility that an attorney and
a client could meet for the first time in a professional context, or perhaps
renew their old platonic friendship, and could begin a consensual sexual
relationship that did not harm the client's interest and was perceived as
beneficial by both parties.308
The open-endedness of the proposed Illinois rule could result in the
disciplining of attorneys who sincerely believe that their clients wished to
have a mutual, fully consensual sexual affair. The attorneys may believe
that their clients are not emotionally dependent, making a romantic liai-
son ethically acceptable. If the relationship between the two parties later
sours or the clients become dissatisfied with the legal representation, they
might complain to the disciplinary commission and raise facts to suggest
that their attorneys should have known of any emotional dependence. In
such a case, clients may honestly believe themselves wronged just as at-
torneys may steadfastly believe their conduct conformed to the bar rule.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A MODIFIED BAN
Growing public concern about sexual misconduct by all professionals,
the startling lack of clarity in current bar rules, and the uneven enforce-
ment of those rules suggest that a specific new ethical rule regarding at-
torney-client sexual relations should be created. Toward that end, this
Article proposes a rule to be adopted by bar associations prohibiting at-
torney-client sexual relations3°9 during the period of representation 310
where the client is a natural person. By its terms, this proposal excludes
situations in which the client is a partnership, corporation, or other en-
tity, such as a labor union, club, or charitable association. Thus officers,
30 (noting that Ninth Circuit report on gender bias found 39% of female attorneys and
8% of male attorneys surveyed claimed to have been sexually harassed by client).
307. See Ill. Proposed Rule of Professional Conduct, supra note 301, Rule 1.17.
308. See id
309. "Sexual relations" should be defined to include, at a minimum, sexual intercourse
and any touching of the intimate or sexual parts of the client for the purpose of sexual
gratification of either party. It could also include the attorney's causing the client to
touch his or her intimate or sexual parts and the attorney's touching his or her own
intimate or sexual parts in front of the client for the purpose of sexual gratification of
either party. Compare Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Rule 3-
120(A) and Or. Code of Professional Responsibility, supra note 292, DR 5-110(C) (defin-
ing sexual relations).
310. A per se rule banning sexual relations would require a prosecutor to prove only
that a sexual encounter occurred during the time of representation. Obviously, problems
of proof can adhere to that issue as well because often one party's word is pitted against
the other's, but at least this rule reduces the number of issues that may be contested in
that manner.
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directors, and other employees of such organizations would be exempt
from the ban. This proposal also includes an exception for pre-existing
lovers such as spouses or others with an established, on-going intimate
relationship before the time of representation.
Evidence indicates that the most serious abuses in this area have typi-
cally occurred in matrimonial practice. 11 Some of the cases, however,
involve criminal3 12 or probate proceedings. 313 Some commentators have
suggested, therefore, that instead of a total prohibition of sexual relations
between attorneys and their clients, the ban should be restricted to the
most suspect areas of practice such as divorce, criminal, and probate
matters on the assumption that these clients are likely to be most vulner-
able to the predations of unscrupulous lawyers.31 4 Unfortunately, these
cases are not the only ones in which clients can be emotionally over-
wrought. Clients filing for bankruptcy, having an immigration problem,
being audited by the Internal Revenue Service, fighting an employment
discharge, or seeking redress for personal injuries could experience con-
siderable emotional trauma, isolation, and vulnerability. For example,
clients in fear of being deported may not be any less upset and worried
than those involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding. Restrictions
on attorney-client sexual relations should apply therefore to all areas of
practice where the client is an individual.
The various proposed rules involving an examination of the attorneys'
or the clients' states of mind are also unworkable. Some proposals have
sought to ban relationships based on coercion, duress, or undue influ-
ence.31 5 These rules necessitate some proof of the parties' mental state.
Coercion, for example, implies both the deliberate exercise of force or
persuasion by attorneys and the unwillingness of their clients. Presuma-
bly, a prosecutor in a disciplinary proceeding would have to demonstrate
that the parties had the requisite state of mind at the time of the sexual
311. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 415 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 1992) (suspending attorney for three
years for sexual relations with client being represented in divorce and custody proceed-
ing); Carter v. Kritz, 560 A.2d 360 (R.I. 1989) (suspending attorney for at least one year
for sexual misconduct toward client being represented in domestic relations case).
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Judith S. Kaye, recently issued a new
set of rules, effective November 1, 1993, to regulate overreaching behavior by New York's
matrimonial bar. The new rules, among other things, prohibit sexual relations between
divorce lawyers and their clients. See Hoffman, supra note 254, at Al.
312. See, e.g., People v. Gibbons, 685 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (disbarring at-
torney for having sexual relations with client's co-defendants in a criminal proceeding);
In re Howard, 681 P.2d 775 (Or. 1984) (publicly reprimanding attorney for accepting sex
in lieu of attorney's fees from client arrested for prostitution ); In re Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings Against Ridgeway, 462 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. 1990) (suspending attorney for hav-
ing sex with client while representing her in possible probation revocation).
313. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith, 752 S.W.2d 786, 787-88 (Ky. 1988)
(publicly reprimanding attorney for professional misconduct resulting from sexual in-
volvement with client being represented in probate matter).
314. See Dubin, supra note 8, at 588; Riga, supra note 6, at 13.
315. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Rule 3-120(B)(2); Ill.
Proposed Rule of Professional Conduct, supra note 301, Rule 1.17(a)(1).
[Vol. 62
A 7TORNEY-CLIENT SEXUAL RELA TIONS
encounters. Unless attorneys use actual physical force, it may be difficult
to prove that their clients were unwilling or that the attorneys realized
the extent of their coercion. Clients may be so intimidated by their attor-
neys' superior position and so paralyzed by their own desperate circum-
stances that they may not resist the lawyers' advances or make any
verbal protest.
The California rule and statute, which link the sexual relationship to
the adequacy of representation, are also deficient.316 Attorneys who initi-
ate sexual affairs with their clients may not continue representation if the
affair causes them to represent their clients incompetently.317 The Cali-
fornia regulations appear premised on the notion that, unless coercion or
quid pro quo arrangements are involved, attorney-client sexual relation-
ships are not inherently undesirable unless they diminish the attorney's
effectiveness as an advocate. In most instances, however, it will be diffi-
cult for the prosecutor to demonstrate that the representation was inade-
quate according to generally accepted standards of the profession. In
any case an attorney must make a multitude of decisions along the way,
particularly if litigation is involved. Unless the lawyer's conduct is
clearly negligent, a state ethics board will not likely find incompetence.3" 8
When attorneys become sexually involved with their clients, inevitably
their professional judgment is tainted because their own personal interest
becomes intertwined with their legal representation. Although attorneys
may continue to make acceptable decisions on their clients' behalf, they
may not use their best judgment to further the clients' interest, that judg-
ment having been clouded by the sexual involvement. A client who sin-
cerely desires a sexual relationship with her attorney may not realize the
hazards to their professional relationship. The attorney must be respon-
sible for desisting from behavior that might harm the client's interests.
Like the California regulations, the Illinois proposal avoids a ban by
prohibiting only those sexual relationships that are involuntarily imposed
316. For the full text of Cal. Code § 6106.9 and Cal. Rule of Professional Conduct 3-
120, see supra notes 274 and 275.
317. The prosecutor in a disciplinary proceeding must show that the legal representa-
tion did not comport with the general standards of the profession. See Cal. Rules of
Professional Conduct, supra note 275, Rule 3-110.
318. The United States Supreme Court has described the difficulty of pinpointing the
deficiencies in representation where attorneys have conflicts of interest:
[I]n a case.. . of conflicting interests the evil-it bears repeating-is in what the
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also
as to possible pretrial plea negotiations .... It may be possible in some cases to
identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to
undertake certain trial tasks, but.., it would be difficult to judge intelligently
the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to
assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics and
decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry
into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided
speculation.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978); see also People v. Castro, 657 P.2d
932, 943-44 (Colo. 1983) (en bane) (quoting same).
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on clients.319 Thus the proposed rule bars sexual relations resulting from
duress, intimidation, or undue influence, or those in which attorneys
knew or should have known that emotional, financial, or other circum-
stances may have impaired their clients' ability to consent. 20 If inter-
preted broadly, the latter provision may produce, in essence, a total ban
on sexual relations between attorneys and their clients. Clients are likely
to have a degree of emotional, if not financial, dependence on their attor-
neys, especially if their liberty, property, or personal well-being is at risk
in pending proceedings.
Lawyers should know that most, if not all, unsophisticated clients are
at least somewhat emotionally dependent on them. The Illinois rule,
however, requires attorneys to know or have reason to know that the
emotional or financial dependence impairs their clients' ability to consent
to a sexual relationship.321 Once again, a broad interpretation of that
language suggests that any kind of emotional dependence on a person in
a superior position impairs an individual's capacity to make free choices.
Although the law and moral codes permit many relationships in nonpro-
fessional contexts that are not truly consensual and lack mutuality,
equality, respect, and trust, a fiduciary who is specially trained and wor-
thy of special trust should be more sensitive to that ideal. Because indi-
vidual clients are rarely impervious to some degree of emotional
dependence on their attorneys, a sexual relationship initiated during the
course of representation is not, in most cases, truly consensual and au-
thentic. Thus attorneys know or should know that the emotional depen-
dence of most clients impairs their ability to voluntarily consent to sexual
relations.
The proposed Illinois rule is tantamount to a ban on sexual relations
between attorneys and their clients under this broad interpretation. As a
prophylactic measure, this Article proposes a total ban on such relations
subject to the exceptions indicated. The danger with the Illinois rule as
proposed is that, if interpreted narrowly, it prohibits attorney-client sex-
ual relations only in very few cases. By requiring that attorneys know or
have reason know that their clients' emotional or financial dependence
impairs their ability to consent to a sexual affair, the Illinois proposal
opens the door to a hearing examiner's or disciplinary board's finding
that attorneys could not have realized the extent of their clients' depen-
dence. The rule may be read to require proof that clients give overt signs
of extraordinary vulnerability and dependence upon their attorneys. In
many cases, however, the signs of dependency are more subtle yet none-
theless real.322
Unlike other suggested per se rules, such as Oregon's, this Article's
319. See Ill. Proposed Rule of Professional Conduct, supra note 301, Rule 1.17.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. For example, clients may not express to their attorneys, "I'd be lost without you,"
but may still believe their attorneys to be their last, best hope. Lawyers may be unaware
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proposal exempts employees and other agents of clients who are not nat-
ural persons from the ban on attorney-client sexual relations. Attorneys
presumably will deal with corporate officers or directors in the course of
representing corporate clients. Although these individuals may have
their own vulnerabilities, they are likely to be more sophisticated in legal
matters than the general population and, hence, less dependent on their
attorneys. Because of the greatly lowered probability of overreaching by
attorneys, the policy of protecting free choice in intimate relationships
outweighs those policies supporting a total ban in this context. Although
it may not be particularly wise for attorneys to initiate sexual relation-
ships with employees of corporate clients, the need for a per se rule here
is considerably reduced. If attorneys' intimate relationships with their
clients' employees creates a conflict of interest or other problem, the ex-
isting bar rules are probably sufficient to address the situation.32
V. ANALYSIS OF A MODIFIED BAN
Any additional regulation of attorney-client sexual relations should
advance sound public policy. Arguably, the uneven enforcement and un-
clear language of current disciplinary rules, as well as the difficulty of
establishing civil liability, adversely affect all parties' interests. Clients
who are victims of their lawyers' sexual misconduct suffer harm to their
emotional, financial, and legal interests. Lawyers remain in doubt about
the standard of conduct required of them and are injured by the public's
perception of them as manipulative and predatory. Disciplinary bodies
must try to prevent the most egregious abuses without the assistance of a
clear standard. Finally, public confidence in the profession is lessened by
the bar's continuing acquiescent attitude.
A rule prohibiting attorney-client sexual relations under all circum-
stances, however, may unduly infringe upon both attorneys' and clients'
rights of privacy and upon clients' right to choose their own counsel. A
ban could also lead, some argue, to a spate of unjustified claims brought
by vengeful clients who are dissatisfied with their attorneys for irrational
reasons. Governmental regulation of any sexual behavior is often consid-
ered an intrusion on privacy and an invitation to blackmail.324
of their clients' financial precariousness if the clients are too embarrassed to explain the
situation, or if finances are not directly relevant to the legal representation.
323. The new Oregon ethics rule prohibits lawyers from having sexual relations with
their entity clients' representatives "if the sexual relations would, or would likely, damage
or prejudice the client in the representation." Or. Code of Professional Responsibility,
supra note 292, DR 5-110(B). As argued above, the existing ethical rules regarding con-
flicts of interest and injury to clients' interests already ban any attorney conduct that
conflicts with or prejudices clients' legal interests, and it is not clear that this part of the
Oregon rule does anything more than reinforce attorneys' duty to desist from behavior
that would harm their clients or create a conflict of interest. See supra notes 295-96 and
accompanying text.
324. Cf Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Con-
duct, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 784-95 (1988) (proposing regulations to limit sexual coercion
in amorous relationships without eliminating sexual freedom).
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A. The Therapist-Patient Analogy
The medical community has long viewed sexual relations between psy-
chiatrists and patients during the course of treatment, and even thereaf-
ter, as totally unacceptable. a25 Such relations potentially cause
immeasurable injury to patients, often worsening depression and even
leading to suicide.3 26 As will be seen, the therapeutic relationship is in
some sense analogous to that of attorney-client.
Because therapy requires patients to share their innermost thoughts
and feeling with trusted therapists, who then assist in resolving conflicts
and other problems, some emotional dependency is deliberately and con-
sciously created.327 Therapists who engage patients in sexual relation-
ships pervert the patients' trust and abuse any emotional dependence.
Many patients are unable to refuse the advances of authority figures in
whom they have placed ultimate trust and confidence.328 Patients may
325. Even the Hippocratic Oath of the Physician states "[w]hatever houses I may visit,
I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all
mischief and in particular of sexual relations with both female and male persons .... ."
The Hippocratic Oath, in Psychiatric Ethics app. at 344 (Sidney Bloch & Paul Chodoff
eds., 1981).
Doctors Masters and Johnson, the noted sex therapists, have condemned sexual rela-
tions between therapists and their patients during the time of treatment:
The ultimate in countertransference is, of course, a therapist seducing a patient
into overt sexual activity. We feel that this approach to the extremely vulnera-
ble patient with a dysfunction is professionally and personally inexcusable....
We feel that when sexual seduction of patients can be firmly established by due
legal process, regardless of whether the seduction was initiated by the patient or
the therapist, the therapist should initially be sued for rape rather than for mal-
practice, i.e., the legal process should be criminal rather than civil.
William H. Masters & Virginia E. Johnson, Principles of the New Sex Therapy, 133 Am.
J. Psychiatry 548, 553 (1976); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
A few psychiatrists have advocated sexual relations between psychiatrists and their
patients as a means of allowing the patients to work through problems of intimacy. In his
autobiography Dr. Martin Shephard recounted numerous incidents in which he had sex-
ual relations with patients individually or in groups-relations that he clearly believed
benefitted his patients as well as himself. See Martin Shepard, A Psychiatrist's Head
(1972) (Dr. Shephard spelled his name "Shepard" in his books). Ultimately, the state of
New York revoked his medical license based on his sexual activities with his patients. See
Shephard v. Ambach, 414 N.Y.S.2d 817, 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
326. See Zelen, supra note 2, at 180-82 (citing literature strongly indicating sexual rela-
tions between therapist and patient are overall highly detrimental, if not devastating, to
patient). The case law involving lawsuits by former patients for sexual misconduct of
their therapists also suggests that these patients suffered considerable emotional distress
as a result of the sexual relationship. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,
1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting client suffered depression and attempted suicide); Zipkin v.
Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (noting client's social isolation and
feelings of guilt).
327. See Freud, supra note 303, at 51-52; Thomas Szasz, The Concept of the Transfer-
ence, 44 Int'l J. Psycho-Analysis 432, 437 (1963).
328. Many of the individuals interviewed by Dr. Peter Rutter as part of his book, Sex
in the Forbidden Zone, reported feeling totally unable to refuse the sexual advances of
their trusted therapist, mentor, pastor, or other authority figure even though some of
them experienced guilt and anguish. See Rutter, supra note 5, at 58-59; see also Marie M.
Fortune, Is Nothing Sacred? 12-45 (1989) (recounting stories of women parishioners se-
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fear rejection by their therapist if they refuse or may hope that the sexual
union will provide relief from the emotional pain that caused them to
seek therapy.329
Sexual relationships between therapists and patients can never advance
patients' well-being and almost always will cause the patients harm.
When therapists pursue the relationship for personal gratification, this
opportunism ultimately will become apparent to their patients, and this
betrayal diverts attention from the problems that caused the patients to
seek therapy in the first place. A therapist in the throes of a sexual rela-
tionship with his patient will likely not pay full and objective attention to
his patient's emotional conflicts. 330 In addition, once the therapist loses
interest in the patient and cuts off the relationship, the patient may feel
abandoned and used, further increasing any feelings of low self-esteem.331
Even in those infrequent cases in which therapists and patients find
that they have fallen in love with each other and seek to have a perma-
nent relationship, the commencement of a sexual relationship during the
course of treatment, nevertheless, can have damaging effects on the pa-
tients. Because of transference, patients may believe erroneously that
duced by their handsome, dynamic pastor); Wayne A. Myers, M.D., Shrink Dreams:
Tales from the Hidden Side of Psychiatry 21-37 (1992) (describing psychiatrist who
manipulated male patient into having sex change operation and then had affair with now-
female patient).
329. See Sydney Smith, The Seduction of the Female Patient, in Sexual Exploitation in
Professional Relationships 57, 59 (Glen 0. Gabbard ed., 1989).
330. Doctors Twemlow and Gabbard have suggested that therapists who have sexual
relationships with patients fall into three broad categories: the psychotic, the antisocial,
and the lovesick. See Stuart W. Twemlow & Glen 0. Gabbard, The Lovesick Therapist,
in Sexual Exploitation in Professional Relationships 71, 72-73 (Glen 0. Gabbard ed.,
1989). The first group contains those therapists who are suffering from a psychotic delu-
sion that causes them to seduce their patients--e.g., the belief that God had ordered them
to impregnate their patients. See i The second group includes counselors who are be-
reft of empathy for their patients and actively seek to exploit them sexually. See id.
Finally, the largest group is comprised of therapists, often well functioning professionals,
who believe that they are in love with their patients. See id In this state of "lovesick-
ness," therapists are often having a narcissistic infatuation with themselves as reflected in
their patients. They idealize the patient and frequently fall into a dreamlike state in their
patients' presence. See id. It is doubtful whether therapists in this condition could be
objective about their patients' problems.
331. Commentators have identified a number of negative consequences to women pa-
tients who have had sexual contact with their therapists. These include:
ambivalence and mistrust of subsequent therapists, doubt of their own sense of
reality, repetition of childhood trauma that became fixated rather than inter-
preted, bondage to the offending therapist, exacerbated sexual dysfunctions and
problems in intimacy with men; guilt and shame associated with the sexual con-
tact; additional difficulties with discussing sexual fantasies in therapy; and feel-
ings of abandonment and disorganization related to the abrupt termination of
the therapy.
Shirley Feldman-Summers, Sexual Contact in Fiduciary Relationships, in Sexual Ex-
ploitation in Professional Relationships 193, 205-06 (Glen 0. Gabbard ed., 1989); see also
Roberta J. Apfel & Bennett Simon, Patient-Therapist Sexual Contact: I. Psychodynamic
Perspectives on the Causes and Results, 43 Psychotherapy & Psychosomatics 57, 57-61
(1985) (discussing range of deleterious effects of patient-therapist sexual relations).
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they are in love with their psychiatrist. 332 Therapists themselves are not
immune to the effects of what is called the "countertransference," in
which therapists transfer onto their patients emotions that they have felt
toward other significant figures in their own lives.333 Under the influence
of the countertransference, therapists may be convinced that they, too,
are in love.
For all of these reasons, the counseling professions have long banned
any kind of sexual activity between therapists and their patients during
the time of treatment.334 The same concerns leading to the ban on thera-
pist-patient sexual relations are equally applicable to the attorney-client
relationship. Arguably, the attorney-client relationship poses the same
risk of overreaching, abuse, betrayal of trust, injury to the clients' inter-
ests, and diversion from the professional goals that originated the rela-
tionship. In this regard, it may be useful to assess the unique attributes
of the therapeutic relationship as compared with those of the attorney-
client relationship.
The psychiatrist-patient relationship is characterized by confidential-
ity, isolation, a relatively long duration, and interaction between a
332. Freud observed that it is common, if not inevitable, for patients experiencing
transference to feel that they have fallen in love with their analysts. He wrote:
[t]he danger of these states of transference evidently consists in the possibility of
the patient misunderstanding their nature and taking them for fresh real exper-
iences instead of reflections of the past. If he (or she) perceives the strong erotic
desire that lies concealed behind the positive transference, he believes that he
has fallen passionately in love .... It is the analyst's task to tear the patient
away each time from the menacing illusion, to show him again and again that
what he takes to be new real life is a reflection of the past.
Freud, supra note 303, at 69.
Another analyst has noted the importance of handling the patient's transference prop-
erly, writing that "[i]f an eroticized and idealized transference to the therapist develops
and is not vigorously analyzed, the effects on the patient's life can be pernicious." Robert
S. Liebert, Transference and Countertransference Issues in the Treatment of Women by a
Male Analyst, in Between Analyst and Patient: New Dimensions in Countertransference
and Transference 229, 231 (Helen C. Meyers ed., 1986).
333. Both Freud and Jung warned against the therapists mishandling of the counter-
transference, which Jung described as follows:
The emotions of patients are always slightly contagious, and they are very con-
tagious when the contents which the patient projects into the analyst are identi-
cal with the analyst's own unconscious contents. Then they both fall into the
same dark hole of unconsciousness, and get into the condition of participation.
This is the phenomenon which Freud has described as countertransference. It
consists of mutual projecting into each other and being fastened together by
mutual unconsciousness.
Jung, supra note 303, at 157; see also Sigmund Freud, Observations on Transference-Love
(Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis III), in Essential Papers
on Transference 37, 42 (Aaron H. Esman ed., 1990) (warning against losing neutrality
and recommending that counter-transference be kept in check). In his recent work on
the countertransference, Dr. Wayne A. Myers recounts his experiences as a supervising
psychiatrist in which some of his supervisees failed to recognize the nature of their
countertransference to their patients, sometimes with devastating results. See Myers,
supra note 328, at 32.
334. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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trained, caring professional on the one hand and a vulnerable lay person
on the other. The attorney-client relationship possesses many of the
same characteristics. Clients typically come to attorneys with important
problems requiring the attorneys' expert advice and may reveal confiden-
tial information about finances, health, personal relationships, and state
of mind. The relationship is often conducted in isolation because, unless
attorneys consult co-counsel, only they and their clients should be privy
to their discussions. Finally, the relationship may be of relatively long
duration if the legal problem requires litigation or other lengthy negotia-
tions or proceedings.
Thus, in several respects, the professional relationships in the legal and
psychiatric worlds are similar in nature. These common characteristics
cause clients in both settings to develop close, trusting, perhaps idealized
relationships with the professional. The danger of transference, counter-
transference, overreaching, seduction, and even rape can be present as
strongly in a legal relationship as in a psychiatric one.335 The risk of
abuse of the client's trust suggests that a ban on attorney-client sexual
relations, similar to the one in the counseling professions, is warranted.
Notwithstanding these similarities, however, the attorney-client rela-
tionship differs in several important respects from the therapist-patient
relationship. One may assume that it is normally of shorter duration and
of lesser intensity than the relationship between psychiatrists and their
patients. Patients often receive psychiatric treatment for months, if not
years, at a time, meeting regularly with their therapists at least once a
week, sometimes as much as four or five times weekly. 336 Although at-
torneys and their clients could have a long-standing relationship, in most
335. The propriety of sexual relations between professionals and their clients has been
raised in other contexts such as doctor-patient, minister-parishioner, and professor-stu-
dent. See Rutter, supra note 5, at 31-36. Although all professions disapprove of forcing
sexual relations on clients, they are less adamant about banning seemingly "consensual"
sexual relationships. See Gromis v. Medical Bd. of Cal., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452, 458-60
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding state medical board could not discipline physician for hav-
ing consensual sexual relationship with patient absent finding that relationship resulted in
negligent treatment of patient); Collins v. Covenant Mutual Ins. Co., 604 N.E.2d 1190,
1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that physician's sexual involvement with patient is
not per se malpractice); Eduardo Cruz, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock- Clergy
Sexual Exploitation and the Search for Solutions, 19 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 499, 504 (1991)
(noting clergy frequently assume counseling functions and therefore are in position to
abuse parishioners' trust through sexual manipulation); Monroe H. Freedman, The Pro-
fessional Responsibility of the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions, 39 Vand. L Rev.
275, 277 (1986) (discussing vulnerability of law students to sexual exploitation by profes-
sors while observing that healthy sexual relationships do result from some professor-stu-
dent liaisons).
In 1990 the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association ("AMA")
adopted a report of the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, which concluded
that "sexual contact or a romantic relationship with a patient concurrent with the physi-
cian-patient relationship is unethical." AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, 266 JAMA 2741, 2745 (1991).
336. See Kenneth S. Pope & Jacqueline C. Bouhoutsos, Sexual Intimacy Between
Therapists and Patients 59 (1986).
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cases attorneys meet with their clients on a less consistent basis. Further-
more, the total focus of the therapeutic relationship is on the thoughts,
feelings, dreams, memories, and impressions of the patients, whereas the
attorney-client relationship has its genesis in the clients' legal problems.
Although clients, particularly in divorce or criminal matters, may reveal
personal information to their attorneys, the thrust of the relationship is
not on the clients' inner lives. Attorneys must be concerned primarily
with objective facts about their clients related to the legal matter at hand.
Because of its shorter duration and decreased intensity, the attorney-
client relationship may be less vulnerable to creation of a transference
and to the possibility of overreaching. In some sense, individuals em-
ploying lawyers may have much more financial and emotional freedom
to discharge their attorneys than do those employing counselors or psy-
chiatrists. Psychiatric patients, on the other hand, may have developed
strong emotional dependence on their therapists and may be reluctant to
terminate the relationship even where the therapists propose a sexual af-
fair. 37 These differences suggest that perhaps attorneys could have a
consensual sexual liaison with clients without overreaching or abusing
them. Mature, relatively stable clients presumably have the ability to
initiate or consent to sexual relations with their attorneys. Existing bar
rules should adequately address any potential conflict of interest
problem.
The less emotionally-charged nature of the attorney-client relationship
may warrant less stringent restrictions on sexual relations than in the
psychiatric sphere. Either more vigorous enforcement of existing rules
on conflicts of interest or enactment of a rule modeled on the Illinois
proposal, which focuses on the clients' vulnerability, may address ade-
quately those situations in which abuses are likely to occur. But, as was
shown above,338 neither the existing ethics rules nor proposals such as
Illinois' create a workable standard of behavior that is both readily un-
derstandable by the bar and capable of consistent enforcement. More-
over, although many attorney-client relationships are less emotionally
intense than those between therapists and their patients, attorneys are
still undeniably in a position of trust and power with respect to their
clients. Clients trust lawyers to use their power wisely on the clients'
behalf. Even if clients desire to have love affairs with their lawyers, attor-
neys should refuse because the romantic involvement likely will prevent
them from devoting total unbiased and objective attention to their cli-
ents' legal needs-a fact of which clients may not be fully aware even
after complete discussion of the matter.
B. Constitutional Implications
Critics argue that a complete ban on attorney-client sexual relations
337. See id. at 46-56.
338. See supra part IV.
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would constitute an undue infringement upon the rights of privacy and
association of both parties and would be, therefore, unconstitutional.33'
This position is highly suspect, as will be demonstrated. Neither a due
process nor an equal protection analysis compels the conclusion that this
Article's proposal of a modified total ban on attorney-client sexual rela-
tions could not survive constitutional attack.
1. Minimal Scrutiny
In recent cases the United States Supreme Court has somewhat
blended due process and equal protection analyses.' Under the Four-
teenth Amendment substantive due process analysis, the Court normally
examines whether a state regulation is rationally related to some legiti-
mate state objective." Similarly, under the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection analysis, the Court examines whether a particular legis-
lative classification is rationally related to some appropriate state pur-
pose. 2 Most likely, the Court would regard a bar rule banning
attorney-client sexual relations during the time of representation as a leg-
islative classification affecting only attorneys and their current clients. 43
Because the rule applies only to these certain classes of individuals and
not to others, its constitutionality is more properly tested through appli-
cation of the Equal Protection Clause.3 " The requirement of state ac-
tion'S under the due process and equal protection clauses is likely
339. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
340. Two constitutional law scholars have noted that "[w]hen the Supreme Court re-
views a law that restricts the liberty of all persons it will review the law under due process
principles. When the Court reviews a law that classifies persons it will use equal protec-
tion principles." John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 11.4, at
374 (4th ed. 1991); see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 16-1 to -
2 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing equal protection and minimum rationality analysis).
341. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13 (1988); Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
491 (1955); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536-37 (1949); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
342. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 603 (1987); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,
331 (1981); Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978).
343. Past and future clients are not affected by the ban because attorneys would be free
to have sexual affairs with their clients after their professional relationship ended. Law-
yers who already are involved in sexual relationships with others, moreover, are allowed
to represent those parties under the exception for pre-existing lovers and spouses.
344. Because most laws involve some creation of classifications among individuals, the
Supreme Court, since its devaluation of substantive due process analysis after 1937, has
tended to review the majority of legislation under the Equal Protection Clause, particu-
larly in the area of fundamental rights. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 340, § 14.1, at
568-69. Unquestionably, a bar rule that restricts lawyer-client sexual relations creates a
category of persons, namely attorneys and their clients, that are prohibited from engaging
in sexual relations. The rule can be enforced only against the attorneys, of course, but it
also operates to restrict the sexual choices of clients as well, who presumably will find it
more difficult to initiate sexual relationships with their attorneys.
345. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that the states shall not "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. See
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satisfied.346
In the absence of legislation involving suspect classifications or funda-
mental rights, the United States Supreme Court employs minimal scru-
tiny to evaluate a statute's constitutionality under the Equal Protection
Clause.3 47 The Court examines whether the legislation has a rational re-
lationship to some legitimate state purpose.348 This standard is intended
to be, of course, highly deferential to the legislative choice and is predi-
cated upon the theory that the Court should not interfere generally with
the policymaking of an elected branch of government.34 9
A bar rule prohibiting attorney-client sexual relations arguably affects
the right of both the lawyer and the client to choose their sexual partners,
the client's right to be represented by counsel of choice, and the lawyer's
right to pursue a livelihood. A per se rule banning attorney-client sexual
relations would prevent both attorneys and clients from engaging in such
activity during the period of the professional relationship. If both par-
ties' desire for a sexual affair was inexorable, then they could terminate
their professional relationship. Under those circumstances, however, the
client would have to select another attorney and would be deprived of the
original attorney's skill in representation. And finally, attorneys who vi-
olate the ban would be subject to discipline by the bar and conceivably
could lose their right to practice law, either temporarily or permanently.
These rights, while significant, would probably not be deemed "funda-
mental" under current United States Supreme Court holdings. There ex-
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 520-27
(1985) (noting that state action exists even where state has not expressly interfered with
one's rights); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 221, 221-24
(noting that Bill of Rights and 14th Amendment apply to acts involving state action).
346. Bar rules are most commonly issued by the supreme courts of their respective
states or by mandatory bar associations, acting as an arm of the state supreme courts. See
Wolfram, supra note 305, at 21, 33-38. The state supreme courts in turn are authorized
by the state constitution, by legislation, or by some form of the inherent powers doctrine
to regulate the bar by performing this essentially legislative function. See id. at 22-31.
Thus the courts' legislation of bar rules should constitute state action within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To the extent that bar associations promulgate lawyer discipline rules with minimal
state supreme court involvement, the state action element is arguably somewhat weaker.
The issue of state action by bar associations has been debated relative to the application of
federal antitrust laws. See id. at 38-44; Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569-74 (1984);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-92 (1975).
347. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
348. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
349. In the 1930s, as the Court moved away from its aggressive use of substantive due
process to invalidate economic and social welfare legislation, it indicated that legislative
choices were to be sustained in most cases. The Court held that "the existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting
ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless.., it is
of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
.... " United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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ists a constitutional right to be represented by counsel in court
proceedings.35 0 Courts also recognize a right to choose one's own coun-
sel, but that right is not absolute and may be counterbalanced by consid-
erations of the fair administration of justice where representation by a
particular attorney would create a potentially serious conflict of inter-
est.35' Although the ability to practice law is an important privilege and
cannot be denied arbitrarily to qualified individuals, "[tihere is no funda-
mental right to practice law... [and a]ttorneys do not constitute a sus-
pect class." '352 Licensed attorneys are all subject to the ethical norms of
the legal profession and can be sanctioned for violating those norms, pre-
sumably to advance the public interest.
The right to engage in intimate relations with another is perhaps the
most arguably "fundamental" right as it relates to an inherently private
sphere of activities in which the justification for state intrusion is weak.
But the United States Supreme Court, as will be discussed more fully
below,3" 3 has never held that there is a fundamental right under the Con-
stitution for single persons to engage in sexual intercourse or for married
350. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932)
(finding the right to counsel fundamental in a criminal proceeding). Courts have viewed
the right to counsel in civil matters as incorporated within the consitutional guarantee of
due process of law. See, ,g., Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) ("A civil litigant's right to retain counsel is
rooted in fifth amendment notions of due process; the right does not require the govern-
ment to provide lawyers for litigants in civil matters.").
351. In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld a
federal district court's refusal to allow a defendant in a criminal proceeding to be repre-
sented by the attorney for two of his co-defendants. The Court held that the lower court
was entitled to refuse the defendant's motion for substitution of counsel based on "a
showing of a serious potential for conflict" of interest if the attorney were to engage in
multiple representations of criminal defendants. Id. at 164. The Court so held notwith-
standing the defendant's willingness to waive any potential conflict. See id. at 163. The
Court stated that "while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney
is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to
guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a
defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Id. at 159.
Similarly, in civil cases, the courts of appeal have held that the right to be represented
by counsel of one's choice, though vital, is not absolute and may be outweighed by "com-
pelling reasons," including an unavoidable conflict of interest. See Bottaro v. Hatton
Ass'ns, 680 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1982); see also McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co.,
714 F.2d 1255, 1263 (5th Cir. 1983) (disqualifying judge's brother-in-law as local defense
counsel); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(upholding order prohibiting in-house and retained counsel for corporation from having
attorney-client relationship with wholly-owned subsidiary during hearing to possibly
divest subsidiary from corporation).
352. Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1012
(1990); see also Frazier v. Heebe, 788 F.2d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that the
right to practice law is not fundamental), rev'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); In
re Roberts, 682 F.2d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that admission to the bar is not a
fundamental right).
353. See infra notes 357-73 and accompanying text.
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persons to do so with someone other than their spouse. A per se rule
banning attorney-client sexual relations, with the exception for spouses
and other pre-existing lovers, regulates only single attorneys and clients
or married attorneys and clients seeking to have an affair with someone
other than their spouse or present lover.
If the rights affected are not fundamental, the proposal should be able
to survive minimal constitutional scrutiny. Certainly, the state has a le-
gitimate interest in preventing lawyers from taking advantage of vulnera-
ble clients by initiating sexual relationships that may compromise the
clients' well-being and the lawyers' competence and objectivity. The
state bar, as the licensing body for attorneys, and the state supreme
court, as the promulgator of ethical rules and the ultimate body before
which lawyers practice, both have a strong interest in preserving the in-
tegrity and efficiency of the practicing bar and in promoting public confi-
dence in the administration of justice.
A modified ban must be rationally related to those legitimate interests.
Under the rational relationship standard, the state must show that the
regulation arguably, if not demonstrably, promotes the state's legitimate
interests.354 A ban on sexual relations between attorneys and their cli-
ents who are individual persons reduces potential conflict of interest
problems, diminishes the risk of loss of objectivity by attorneys, and pro-
tects clients against predatory seductions.355 While no rule can com-
pletely eliminate unethical conduct, its mere existence coupled with its
vigorous enforcement would send a clear message to the bar that courts
will not tolerate amatory exploitation of clients.
2. Strict Scrutiny
Where legislation creates a suspect classification or impinges upon a
fundamental right, the Supreme Court will examine the law closely
under the Equal Protection Clause to ensure that it is narrowly tailored
to foster a compelling state interest.35 6 The right to engage in sexual
relations with a partner of one's choice may be viewed as a fundamental
right within that group of privacy decisions defining personhood and af-
firming basic notions of liberty in a free society.
Among the few fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme Court
are those concerning procreation, marriage, and family relationships.
The Court has held that decisions to beget a child,357 to terminate a preg-
nancy,3 58 to marry, 359 or to educate children in a particular way 36° are
354. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1988); City of New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963).
355. See supra part IV.
356. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 340, § 14.3, at 575-76.
357. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
358. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
359. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (reaffirming fundamental right
to marry); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (finding court fees for indi-
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fundamental and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"3 61 or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.136 2 In Bowers v.
Hardwick,363 however, the Court held that homosexuals have no funda-
mental right to engage in consensual acts of sodomy, even in the privacy
of their homes.3 4 In Bowers the Court reviewed its line of privacy cases,
including Loving v. Virginia,365 Griswold v. Connecticut,3" and Eisenstadt
v. Baird,367 and concluded that "any claim that these cases... stand for
the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between con-
senting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable. 368
Most of the Court's privacy decisions have focused on family relation-
ships including marriage, procreation, and child rearing. The Court has
recognized the sanctity of the marriage relationship and the inherent un-
desirability of governmental intrusion into the intimate decisions between
husbands and wives. These cases provide, at best, tangential support for
the rights of unmarried persons to be free from governmental interfer-
ence in sexual matters. The Court has acknowledged, however, that even
unmarried persons have some fundamental rights concerning the use of
contraception and the decision to have an abortion.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,369 the Court struck down a Massachusetts stat-
ute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons.3 70 The Court found that the statute failed to pass even minimal
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because the distinction be-
tween married and unmarried persons was not rationally related to the
gents desiring divorce unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (hold-
ing race cannot restrict freedom to marry).
360. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding state statute
requiring children to attend public school unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923) (holding state statute prohibiting teaching of any foreign language in
Nebraska schools).
361. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
362. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
363. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
364. See id. at 191-96. But see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)
(holding state statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy unconstitutional under equal
treatment and liberty provisions of Kentucky state constitution).
365. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
366. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
367. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
368. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. The Colorado Supreme Court, in upholding the consti-
tutionality of a criminal statute penalizing both consensual and nonconsensual sexual
relations by psychotherapists with their clients, noted that:
while certain private activities and intimate relationships may qualify for the
elevated status of fundamental constitutional rights, it has never been the law
that consenting adults, solely by virtue of their adulthood and consent, have a
constitutionally protected privacy or associational right to engage in any type of
sexual behavior of their choice under any circumstances.
Ferguson v. State, 824 P.2d 803, 808 (Colo. 1992).
369. 405 U.S. at 438.
370. See id at 443.
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state's asserted goals.371 Relying primarily on the statute's arbitrary dis-
tinction between married and unmarried persons, the Court avoided the
need to decide whether unmarried individuals have a fundamental right
to buy and use contraceptives. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
however, did suggest that unmarried individuals, to the same extent as
married individuals, enjoy a fundamental constitutional right of privacy
in matters relating to procreation. He wrote, "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.
, 372
Justice Brennan's comment may have applied only to procreative mat-
ters and not to sexual matters in general. In other words, unmarried
persons may have a fundamental right to make procreative decisions
without undue governmental interference but may not have a fundamen-
tal right to engage in sexual intercourse. On the other hand, procreation
and sexual relations may be regarded as inextricably bound together.
Recognizing that control over procreation is a fundamental right leads
inevitably to the idea that control over one's sexuality and sexual expres-
sion is fundamental as well. 3 7 3
Assuming that the right of unmarried persons to choose their sexual
partners is a fundamental right, a ban on attorney-client sexual relations
would violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the regulation is neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest. The proper admin-
istration of justice and the protection of clients from rapacious lawyers
arguably constitute compelling state interests. If the vast majority of sex-
ual relationships initiated between lawyers and their clients during the
time of representation result from overreaching by lawyers and cause in-
jury to their clients, then the state should be justified in restricting such
associations.
Arguably, an across-the-board ban on such relationships where the cli-
ent is an individual is not narrowly tailored to achieve its stated purpose.
In other words, regulations such as the Illinois and California proposals
that focus on clients' vulnerability or attorneys' competence have at-
tempted to identify the specific problems occasioned by a lawyer-client
371. The Court rejected as implausible that the state's asserted goals of preventing
premarital sex and of protecting the health of unmarried persons. See id. at 448. It found
that prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives was not likely to prevent premarital sex
and that the statutory requirement that physicians prescribe contraceptives for married
persons could equally protect the health of unmarried persons. See id. at 448-52.
372. Id. at 453.
373. The Court's decision in Bowers can be restricted to state prohibition of homosex-
ual activities. The Court chose not to address the state's power to prohibit acts of sod-
omy by consenting heterosexual adults. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2(1986). Even in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where the Court acknowledged that
the fundamental right of privacy encompassed a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy, it conceded that the right of privacy was not so broad that "one
has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases. . . ." Id. at 154.
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affair and are supposedly written in such a way as to eliminate these
problems. But, as discussed elsewhere in this Article,374 these proposals
present almost insurmountable problems of proof or leave clients unpro-
tected in situations of potential abuse. If interpreted expansively the pro-
posals could amount to a virtual across-the-board ban on attorney-client
sexual relations and, in that sense, would be no more narrowly tailored
than a prohibition.
Thus a modified ban is arguably the most narrowly tailored regulation
that could effectively protect the public interest in preventing overreach-
ing of vulnerable clients. In addition, such a ban represents only a slight
intrusion on the parties' rights of privacy. Attorneys and their clients
may still have a sexual liaison simply by terminating their professional
relationship. It will be an extremely rare case where an individual cli-
ent's legal problems are so esoteric that adequate substitute counsel can-
not be obtained. Or, if both parties want the original attorney to
continue the representation, they can defer beginning their intimate rela-
tionship until the end of the representation. This deferral does not repre-
sent nearly the kind of intrusion on privacy that the state statutes
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives and banning abortions did in
Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade.
CONCLUSION
All fiduciary relationships are founded on the premise that fiduciaries
should not engage in self-dealing to the detriment of their clients or pa-
tients. Attorneys who engage in sexual relations with clients with whom
they were previously unacquainted do so largely, if not exclusively, for
their own benefit. Most likely, lawyers do not consider whether a sexual
affair will benefit their clients; perhaps they assume superficially that it
will. But, in many cases, clients will be injured emotionally or financially
by the relationship or will suffer some loss of quality in their legal
representation.
Parties who meet for the first time in the context of an attorney-client
relationship may become attracted to each other and desire a sexual af-
fair. Certainly, this desire may be perfectly legitimate and even beneficial
if both parties are single, consenting adults. The considerable dangers of
overreaching by attorneys and consequent injury to their clients in many
cases, however, dictate that bar rules prohibit lawyers from initiating sex-
ual relationships with clients during the period of representation. If both
parties wish to pursue a sexual relationship immediately, lawyers can ar-
range for competent substitute counsel and can end the professional rela-
tionship. Otherwise, both parties should wait until the attorney-client
relationship comes to a natural close before pursuing a more personal
relationship.
374. See supra part IV.
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